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ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE: OBSERVATIONS FROM




The Uniform Consumer Credit Code,' on the whole, is a good
substantive statute.2 Among other things, it creates a much more ra-
tional system for the regulation of consumer credit transactions 3 than
t Professor of Law, The University of Oklahoma School of Law.
* The aid of my research assistant, Sally Mock, is gratefully acknowledged in
connection with the preparation of this article.
1. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1969 Official Text with Comments), as
amended, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 173 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UCCC]. The full text of the UCCC
with comments can be found in 1 CCH CONSUMER CRDrr GUIDE 5001-5703. As of
this writing, seven states have enacted the UCCC. They are (1) Colorado, (2) Idaho,
(3) Indiana, (4) Kansas, (5) Oklahoma, (6) Utah, and (7) Wyoming. 1 CCH CON-
SUMER CREDIT GUIDE 4770.
2. There are a plethora of articles concerning this For a concise general treat-
ment, see, e.g., Malcolm, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus. IAw. 937
(1970). For a more detailed discussion, see, e.g., Jordan & Warren, The Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 387 (1968). For a symposium, see, e.g.,
Symposium-Consumer Credit Reform, 33 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROB. 639 (1968). For
a detailed analysis concerning the impact the enactment of the UCCC would have in
a particular state, see, e.g., Robertson, Myth and Reality in Consumer Credit Rate Regu-
lation, 43 MIss. LJ. (1972). Not all writings have been complimentary, however. Per-
haps the broadest criticism is found in 1 CONSUMER VIENMonors (R. Elbrecht ed.
1971). For a reply to some of the criticism, see, e.g., Moo, Consumerism and the
UCCC, 25 Bus. Law. 957 (1970). The criticism and the experience to date in the en-
acting states have prompted work on a revision of the UCCC, which is presently in the
fourth working redraft. CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, Issue No. 210, Dec. 18, 1972
[hereinafter cited as RUCCC].
3. A "consumer credit transaction" under the UCCC is a sale of goods, services,
or an interest in land in which credit is granted by a person who regularly engages as
a seller in credit transactions of the same kind; the buyer is a person other than an or-
ganization; the goods, services, or interest in land are purchased primarily for a per-
sonal, family, household, or agricultural purpose; either the debt is payable in install-
ments or a credit service charge (hereinafter "finance charge") is made; and, with re-
spect to a sale of goods or services, the amount financed does not exceed $25,000.
UCCC § 2.104(1); applicable definitions are found respectively in UCCC §§ 2.105,
1.301, 2.109, 2.111. But see exceptions in UCCC §§ 2.104(3), 1.106. A "con-
sumer credit transaction" also includes a loan made by a person regularly engaged
in the business of making loans in which the debtor is a person other than an organi-
zation; the debt is incurred primarily for a personal, family, household, or agricultural
purpose; either the debt is payable in installments or a loan finance charge (hereinaf-
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the hodgepodge of fragmented statutes and case law presently consti-
tuting the system in most states.4 For example, it avoids the ludicrous
situation of billions of dollars in open-end credit 5 in search of a legal
shelter.6 It also allows the inclusion in the legal consumer credit mar-
ket of most consumers and most creditors without undue barriers to
entry and operation, which lays the groundwork for more of the free
enterprise system to prevail.7  Finally, it modernizes the balance be-
tween creditors and debtors so that the reasonable needs of each are
accommodated.8  But much of this would be only a facade unless the
ter "finance charge") is made; and either the principal does not exceed $25,000 or the
debt is secured by an interest in land. UCCC § 3.104(1) applicable definitions are
found respectively in UCCC H9 3.106, 1.301, 3.109, 3.107(3). But see exceptions in
UCCC §§ 3.104(2), 1.106. However, a "consumer credit transaction" does not in-
clude certain excluded transactions (UCCC § 1.202), nor does it include (except with
respect to disclosure, civil liability for violation of disclosure provisions, and the
debtor's right to rescind certain transactions) a sale of an interest in land if the fi-
nance charge does not exceed 109o "simple" per year, or a loan primarily secured by an
interest in land if at the time the loan is made the value of the collateral is substantial
in relation to the amount of the loan and the finance charge does not exceed 10% "sim-
ple" peryear. UCCC §§ 2.104(2)(b), 3.104(1), 3.105.
Moreover, the UCCC also governs consumer leases (UCCC § 2.106), consumer
related transactions (basically sales or loans to individuals of $25,000 or less made
by non-merchant sellers or non-professional lenders or made for a business purpose,
UCCC H9 2.602-.604, 3.602-.604), and transactions which are neither consumer
credit transactions nor consumer-related transactions (basically sales or loans in excess
of $25,000 or made to organizations, UCCC H9 2.605, 3.605), although in each of
these circumstances the regulation is less or freedom of contract fundamentally prevails.
See generally Miller, The Basic Exclusions from the UCCC: A Roadmap for Traversing
a New World with Oblique Guides, 43 U. COLO. L. Rav. 269 (1972).
4. See generally, B. CURAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEISLATION (1965).
Thus, the UCCC replaces the system with exceptions on the sales side under the time-
price doctrine and perhaps a retail installment sales act, and on the loan side with a
small loan law, an industrial loan law or case law validating the Morris plan, an install-
ment loan law, a provision denying corporations the defense of usury, and so on. See
UCCC § 9.103 and notes following.
5. See UCCC §§ 2.108, 3.108. "Open end credit," among other things, includes
revolving charge accounts and lender credit cards like bank credit cards. At the end
of June, 1972, alone, $4.5 billion of consumer credit was outstanding under bank
credit cards. 4 CCII CONSUMER CREDIT GuIn Report 102, Sept. 12, 1972, at 5.
6. Compare State v. J.C Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970),
with Sliger v. R.H. Macy & Co., 59 N.J. 465, 283 A.2d 904 (1971) (revolving charge
accounts). Compare Kass v. Central Charge Serv., Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE % 99,161 (D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. Div. July 15, 1972), with Op. Att'y Gen. of
Idaho, Sept. 16, 1969, 4 CCH CoNsUMER CRDIT GUm % 99,752 (lender credit
cards). Considering this state of affairs, it is not surprising that more and more states
are adding yet another layer of legislation to their systems described in note 4, supra,
to settle the problem. See 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GuIm 630 (Charts). In a
UCCC state, however, open end credit is already realistically accommodated within the
same statute that controls other forms of credit. See UCCC §§ 1.301(9), (16), 2.104,
3.104, 3.106.
7. See Robertson, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., Miller, Book Review, 56 IowA L. REv. 716 (1971).
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statute also provided adequate means for its enforcemen with reference
to creditor conduct. This article will discuss this crucial aspect of the
Code.
A number of articles have already been written concerning en-
forcement of the UCCC.1' But to date, no article has appeared that
has used the actual experience in a UCCC state to any appreciable de-
gree as a basis for ascertaining and evaluating the deficiencies, if any,
in its enforcement provisions. On the assumption that the proof of the
pudding is in the tasting, this article will draw heavily on the Oklahoma
experience."1
9. See, e.g., Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit
Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 535, 535 (1967):
The draftsmen of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code... have thus far
directed most of their time and effort to establishing a permissive pattern
within which creditors give and debtors receive credit. . . . mhese per-
missive, or authorizing, guidelines of the Credit Code are clearly its most
important aspects.
Underlying much of the thinking of the Credit Code draftsmen is an as-
sumption that most debtors will honor their debts and most creditors will obey
the law. Remedies follow violation, and, since violation is really the excep-
tion rather than the rule, the pattern of remedies in existing consumer-credit
legislation is haphazard. It is, therefore, important, though only secondarily
so, to consider what happens when either debtor or creditor violates a statu-
tory provision or a term of his bargain.
While the above places the matter in proper perspective, still the need for any statute or
regulation at all suggests that the question of enforcement is a not too distant second
consideration. There is much truth that "[ilt is axiomatic that no regulatory legisla-
tion can be stronger than its enforcement provisions." Spanogle, The U3C-It May
Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 624, 624 (1968); cf. Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t (1970) [hereinafter cited as CCPA].
Section 1633 only allows the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to
exempt by regulation from the requirements of that statute "any class of credit transac-
tions within any State if it determines that under the law of the State that class of trans-
actions is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposd by the CCPA,
and that there is adequate provision for enforcement" (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Braucher, Administrative Enforcement Including Licensing, 26 Bus.
LAw. 907 (1971); Curran, Administration and Enforcement Under the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PRon. 737 (1968); Dole, Private Enforce-
ment of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAw. 915 (1971); Felsenfeld, supea
note 9; Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25
Bus. Ltw. 511, 513-19 (1970); Jordan & Warren, supra note 2, at 417-32; Spanogle,
supra note 9; Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Ef-
chew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAw. 1039 (1968); and Note, Enforcement Un-
der the UCCC, 55 MINN. L. Rav. 572 (1971).
11. That experience, as of this writing, encompasses three and one-half years, the
effective date of the UCCC in Oklahoma (OKL.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103
(1972) [hereinafter cited as OKLAHoMA UCCC]) being July 1, 1969. It may also be
noted that the title of this article refers to the federal experience. The UCCC, of
course, is not a federal statute. However, the CCPA contains many provisions which
are substantially similar to provisions contained in the UCCC; therefore the federal
experience under those provisions is included in the discussion to the extent it appears
transferable. In short, this article will apply hindsight to assess the validity of the
foresight indulged in by the authors, and others, listed in note 10, supra, particularly
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Discussion of the enforcement provisions will be organized in the
following manner: First, the enforcement provisions of the UCCC will
be grouped into five basic categories. Some indication of the current
published opinion regarding probable effectiveness will be given at or
near the beginning of the discussion of each of these five methods. An
enumeration of provisions or examples will also be provided. Then the
operation of the statute in practice will be described. Finally, comment
will be made on its puissance as demonstrated in practice-including,
as applicable, suggestions for revision. Inevitably, considering the
newness of the statute and the proclivities of the author, discourses on
theory, usually untested, may have crept in, but hopefully this will en-
hance rather than detract from any value in the discussion. One should
keep in mind that these five categories are only creatures of convenience
for purposes of this article; in practical fact these methods cannot exist
in isolation from each other, and normally, as will appear from the dis-
cussion, effective enforcement depends on the utilization of more than
one of them to resolve a particular situation.
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE UCCC
The UCCC provides criminal sanctions12 for persons who engage
in the following conduct: (1) a supervised lender1" who willfully 4
those whose vision was critical as opposed to general. See, e.g., Fritz, supra note 10, at
513-19; Spangole, supra note 9. To the extent this effort may be subject to Felsen-
feld's observation that what has passed for learning in this area has more often been
generalization drawn from, limited experience, Felsenfeld, supra note 9, at 566, at least
it can be said that the experience used here has been under the actual statute involved.
Finally, evaluating this exprience will obviously necessitate some generalization and
the formulation of opinions. While I am deeply grateful to the former Oklahoma Ad-
ministrator, Bill Roberts, and the staff of the Oklahoma Department of Consumer
Affairs (the "Administrator" in Oklahoma is the state official who heads the Department
of Consumer Affairs, which is the state agency created to administer the OKLAHOMA
UCCC, UCCC § 6.103, OKLAHOMA UCCC §§ 6-103, 6-501) for their help with respect
to the information which went into this article, all opinions based on that information
are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
12. The details of the sanctions are in part left up to individual state enact-
ment by the UCCC. Thus, a violation of UCCC § 5.501 is characterized as a mis-
demeanor and imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year is provided in two sit-
uations, but the amounts of the fines in all situations are left up to local decision. Okla-
homa provided for fines of up to $500 in two situations, and for a fine of up to $5000
in the third, OKLAHOMA UCCC § 5-301. A violation of UCCC § 5.302 is left open
as to characterization as a misdemeanor or a felony, but a fine of up to $5000 or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, is provided. Oklahoma characterized
the violation as a misdemeanor, OKLAHOMA UCCC § 5-302; cf. CCPA § 1611
(substantively the same as UCCC § 5.302, provides for a fine of up to $5000 or im-
prisonment for not more than one year, or both).
13. UCCC § 3.501(4).
14. "Willfully" is not defined by the UCCC. In Oklahoma, the term is defined in
1973] UCCC ENFORCEMENT 1233
makes charges in excess of those permitted by the provisions of UCCC
article 3, part 5;15 (2) a person, other than a supervised financial or-
ganization, 16 who willfully engages in the business of making super-
vised loans 7 without a license in violation of the provisions applying
to authority 8 to make supervised loans;19 (3) a person who willfully
engages in the business of making consumer credit sales, consumer
leases, or consumer loans,20 or of taking assignments of rights against
debtors arising therefrom and undertakes direct collection of payments
or enforcement of these rights, without complying with the provisions
concerning notification 2' or payment of fees;22 (4) a person who will-
fully and knowingly23 gives false or inaccurate information or fails to
provide information that he is required to disclose under the provisions
of the UCCC on disclosure and advertising24 or of any related rule of the
Administrator25 adopted pursuant to the UCCC;26  (5) a person who
Title 21, of the Oklahoma Statutes, dealing with Crimes and Punishments, as follows:
"The term 'wilfully' when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted,
implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or the omission referred to.
It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any
advantage." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 92 (1958). Without more, it might appear
that this definition should hold for purposes of OKLAHoMA UCCC § 5-301. But it is
submitted that there is more, and it is therefore highly dubious whether this definition
of "willfully" should be used in OKLAHoMA UCCC § 5-301, or any similar definition
with respect to UCCC § 5.301. A discussion of the reasons for this observation will
appear later in this article.
15. UCCC § 5.301(1). Presumably the basic violation here is imposing a finance
charge in excess of the rates permitted by UCCC § 3.508, but in light of UCCC §
3.513, which makes all provisions of the UCCC applying to consumer loans generally
applicable to the loans covered by UCCC art. 3, pt. 5, except as otherwise provided,
it is doubtful whether it is the only violation. See, e.g., UCCC § 3.203.
16. UCCC § 1.301(17).
17. UCCC § 3.501(3).
18. UCCC § 3.502.
19. UCCC § 5.301(2).
20. See note 3 supra.
21. UCCC § 6.201, 6.202.
22. UCCC §§ 6.201, 6.203, 5.301(3).
23. ' Willfully" is not defined by the UCCC, but see note 14 supra. "Knowingly"
is also not defined. In Oklahoma, again the term is defined in title 21 of the Okla-
homa Statutes, as follows: "The term 'knowingly,' when so applied, imports only
a knowledge that the facts exist which bring the act or omission within the provisions of
this Code. It does not require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act or omis-
sion." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 96 (1958).
24. UCCC art. 2, pt. 3 and art. 3, pt. 3.
25. UCCC § 6.104(2). In Oklahoma, the Administrator, pursuant to OKLA-
HOMA UCCC § 6-104(2), has substantially adopted, as a state rule, the provisions of
Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. Part 226 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Regulation Z], the implementing regulation for the CCPA (see CCPA § 1604). See
Rules of the Administrator, Department of Consumer Affairs, Part H-Disclosure
and Advertising-Regulation Z, 3 CCH CONSUMER CREDr GUIME (Okla.) I 6521-
661 (hereinafter cited as Oklahoma Regulation Z). For a discussion of the relation-
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willfully and knowingly uses any rate table or chart, the use of which
is authorized by rule of the Administrator 7 adopted pursuant to the
provisions on calculation of rate to be disclosed,28 in a manner that con-
sistently understates the annual percentage rate determined according
to those provisions; 29 and (6) a person who willfully and knowingly
otherwise fails to comply with any requirement of the provisions on dis-
closure and advertising or of any related rule of the Administrator.8"
"Criminal sanctions . . . are . . . often dismissed on the ground
that they are little used in practice."'s Even the draftsmen of the
UCCC have commented: "[D]istrict attorneys usually have more re-
warding matters to attend to than prosecuting tax-paying, politically
aware businessmen. 32  To date in Oklahoma, there have been no
criminal prosecutions under the Oklahoma UCCC.s The federal ej-
perience has been much the same.14  Nonetheless, "little use" should
not necessarily be equated with "little utility."
One commentator argues that little use of criminal sanctions in
consumer credit legislation may not portray the complete picture.
Thus, an attorney's advice to a client regarding a proposed course of
ship between the UCCC and any related rule of the Administrator concerning dis-
closure, see Miller, Living with Both the UCCC and Regulation Z, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 1
(1973).
26. UCCC § 5.302(1), CCPA § 1611(1) is much the same.
27. UCCC §§ 6.104(1)(e), (2).
28. UCCC § 2.304, 3.304.
29. UCCC § 5.302(2). CCPA § 1611(2) is much the same.
30. UCCC § 5.302(3). CCPA § 1611(3) is much the same.
31. Spanogle, supra note 9, at 635 n.43.
32. Jordan & Warren, supra note 2, at 419.
33. Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma Department
of Consumer Affairs, Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972.
34. J. Mitchell, U.S. Att'y Gen., REP. OF Tim Arr'y GEN. TO THE CONG. OF Via
U.S. ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE I OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT PRoTTION ACT
OF 1968 FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1970 (1971), cited in 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE JM 99,593, 99,248. The report for 1970 indicates no criminal prosecutions initi-
ated for violations of CCPA § 1611. Of the twelve cases referred to United States
Attorneys during that year for consideration as to criminal prosecution, prosecution
was declined in ten and two were under investigation. The report for 1971 shows
that prosecution was declined in these two cases and in five others referred during
1971, that four more cases were under investigation, and that on Nov. 19, 1971, the
grand jury for the Western District of Wisconsin did return indictments against eight
individuals charging violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970). J. Mitchell, U.S. Att'y
Gen., REP. OF THE AT'y GEN. TO THE CONG. OF THE U.S. ON ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE
I OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECnON ACT OF 1968 FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR
1971 (1972), cited in 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GumE 99,248. Further developments,
including two more indictments, are reported in R. Kleindienst, U.S. Att'y Gen., REP.
OF THE ATT'Y GEN. TO THE CONG. OF THE U.S. ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF TiTLE I
OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTEcTION ACT OF 1968 FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1972,
(1973), cited in 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GumE 99,072.
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questionable conduct may be far less cautious when money alone is
being risked than if criminal sanctions, and the attendant publicity,
could be involved, even though a criminal action has never been brought
in the state.35 Whatever truth there is in this observation, it is sub-
mitted that the criminal sanctions of the UCCC have a great deal more
potential utility than that.
For example, the UCCC provides that persons engaged in making
consumer credit sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans in the enact-
ing state and persons having an office or place of business in the enact-
ing state who take assignment of and undertake direct collection of pay-
ments from or enforcement of rights against debtors arising from these
sales, leases, or loans must file notification with the Administrator
within thirty days after commencing business in the state and thereafter
on or before January 31 of each year. Such persons also must pay an
annual fee to the Administrator on or before January 31 of each year. 6
It is estimated from studies conducted by the Department of Business
Research, University of Oklahoma, and from available sales tax lists
that there are approximately twelve thousand non-lender creditors (re-
tailers, automobile dealers, and acceptance companies) operating in
Oklahoma subject to jurisdiction under the above provisions.17 A large
number of these persons filed and paid on their own initiative, or upon
prompting by the Administrator after their failure to comply was dis-
covered by (1) a check for a notification filing in connection with a
consumer complaint lodged against them;8 s (2) a check for notification
filings by dealers with whom licensees undergoing examinations 39 had
dealt; and (3) spot checks of merchants by the staff of the Department
of Consumer Affairs in various locales on a random basis. 40 Indeed,
the Oklahoma Administrator even designed a decal which could be
posted on the door of a merchant who had filed notification and paid
his fees to demonstrate that he had joined the "club.' Notwithstand-
35. Spanogle, supra note 9, at 635 n.43.
36. UCCC art. 6, pt. 2. In Oklahoma, the coverage of these provisions was re-
duced by exempting supervised financial organizations and licensees from their re-
quirements. OAH Io,_A UCCC § 6-201.
37. [1971] OKLA. ADMR OF CONSUMER Ar'Ams ANNuAL REP. 1 (1971) [herein-
after cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
38. Under Or.Anom UCCC § 6-104(1) (a) the Administrator may receive and
act on complaints. UCCC § 6.104(1) (a) is the same.
39. Under Onr.nom.u. UCCC § 3-506(1), the Administrator shall examine at
times he deems necessary the loans, business, and records of every licensee. UCCC
§ 3.506(1) is the same.
40. Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma Department
of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972; 1971 ANNUAL, REPORT 3.
41. Braucher, supra note 10, at 909-10.
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ing all this effort, however, and even allowing for some considerable
margin of error in the estimate of twelve thousand non-lender creditors,
a significant number of Oklahoma non-lender creditors have not as yet
complied with the law.42
Under the UCCC there is no private remedy for a consumer against
a creditor who does not file a notification and pay fees, and creditor
failure to do so in no way impairs rights on the debt.43 Thus one is
basically remitted to administratively initiated action to enforce these
provisions. The Administrator can, for example, bring a civil action
to restrain a person from violating the UCCC and for other appropriate
relief.44 It is immediately obvious, however, that if such civil actions
must be brought against more than a handful of recalcitrant creditors,
little or no other administrative enforcement endeavors will be feasible
for approximately the next decade. Something more is needed. Con-
sequently, an additional remedy is currently being experimented with
by the Oklahoma Administrator: a civil action to restrain and to re-
cover a requested penalty of up to five thousand dollars from creditors
who have had lengthy correspondence from the Oklahoma Department
of Consumer Affairs repeatedly advising them of their duty to file a
notification and pay fees.45 If anything near the requested maximum
civil penalty is awarded in one or two such suits, it can be expected that
the result will have some salutary effect on overall creditor conduct
with respect to notification and fees.
Nonetheless, while one can certainly believe that if any such case
is well-prepared and forcefully argued that its outcome will be satis-
factory, it would perhaps be naive automatically to assume that any
such penalty (which might well be a great deal less than the requested
five thousand dollars) will be sufficient alone to accomplish the desired
general compliance. It is in this context, perhaps, that one of the
42. There are 4909 filed notifications. Later study does indicate that there is an
error in the twelve thousand figure given in the text; the proper figure is probably
closer to 8500. Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma
Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, March 1, 1973.
43. UCCC § 5.202(5).
44. UCCC § 6.110.
45. The Administrator may bring a civil action against a creditor or a person act-
ing in his behalf to recover a civil penalty for willfully violating the statute, and if the
court finds that the defendant has engaged in a course of repeated and willful viola-
tions, it may assess a civil penalty of no more than $5000. OK-AHoMA UCCC § 6-113
(2). UCCC § 6.113(2) is the same. The word "willful" is not defined, and what it
should mean in any context is a problem alluded to before and which will be dis-
cussed later. See note 14, supra. Suffice to say in the context of the discussion here
that the creditor conduct should be willful in almost any sense of the word.
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criminal sanctions of the UCCC should come into play. The UCCC
also provides for a criminal penalty for any person who willfully en-
gages in the business of making consumer credit sales, consumer leases,
or consumer loans, or of taking assignments of fights against debtors
arising therefrom and undertakes direct collection of payments or en-
forcement of these rights, without complying with the notification and
fee provisions.46 If a successful criminal prosecution or two could be
accomplished in fact situations like the ones for which the civil penalty
might be requested (although not necessarily in the same cases), it is
reasonable to surmise that any conviction sustained would have a bene-
ficial effect at least equal to that of a successful recovery in the civil
action. 47 Moreover, the two penalties in tandem should unequivocally
write the lesson sufficiently to bring the remaining notification hold-
outs into line. And while it may be true that the Administrator cannot
get the local prosecuting attorney to prosecute every merchant in town
for not joining the club, 48 obtaining prosecution of one or a handful of
merchants under the circumstances present at this stage is a very differ-
ent thing and should be feasible.49
I have thus suggested that the criminal sanctions of the UCCC may
have a real use as an adjunct or supplement to other remedies for cer-
tain violations of the statute. But it is also probable that in a few
instances they may furnish a primary remedy for particular kinds of vio-
lations. To illustrate, consider a loan-shark operation with an un-
licensed creditor making small loans at exorbitant rates to low-income
and welfare consumers without disclosure of terms and with repayment
being accomplished in a number of cases with implied or actual threats
of violence. 50 In such circumstances, the Administrator should and no
46. UCCC § 5.301(3).
47. "Fines tend to be insignificant when compared to the potential dollar loss a
large financer faces when credit transactions involving millions of dollars may be subject
to civil penalties." Felsenfeld, supra note 9, at 544. True enough, but first we are talk-
ing here about generally small merchants, and second, the publicity is the true sanc-
tion, whatever the fine, since these merchants are reputable, albeit independent and
stubborn, businessmen.
48. Braucher, supra note 10, at 909.
49. The General Counsel of the Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs in-
forms me that, while to his knowledge, no criminal prosecutions have yet been re-
quested in connection with a failure to file notification and pay fees, general explora-
tory conversations in this regard have not been entirely unproductive, and that in at
least one instance he has received a strong indication of cooperation. Interview with
James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, in
Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972.
50. The Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs has uncovered at least one
situation which, on the information presently available, appears to accord in most
1973] 1237
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doubt would file a civil action seeking an injunction,51 a recovery of all
amounts paid and the avoidance of all amounts owed, 52 and a civil
penalty in the maximum amount.5 3  However, even if a judgment were
rendered on all counts for the Administrator in such an action, thus
theoretically putting an end to the operation as it was then constituted,
a question as to the effectiveness of the remedy for the future might be
raised. After all, a creditor already operating so far outside the law
might not reform and cooperate under an injunction, even one tightly
drawn to prevent technical evasions. The creditor's customers would
respects with the hypothetical operation described in the text. The Administrator has
filed a civil action alleging violations of the Oklahoma UCOC's licensing, disclosure,
maximum charge, extortionate extension of credit, and other provisions, and requesting
an injunction, a recovery of amounts paid and the avoidance of amounts owed, and
a civil penalty, as suggested would be done in the following text. Interview with
James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs,
in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972.
51. UCCC § 6.110. The violations involved would be of the licensing provisions
(UCCC §§ 3.501, 3.502), the maximum charge provisions (UCCC § 3.508), the dis-
closure provisions (UCCC § 3.306 and, pursuant to UCCC § 6.104(2), any rule of the
Administrator such as Regulzation Z as a state rule), and no doubt others including
UCCC § 5.107.
52. Under UCCC § 5.202(2), a violation of UCCC § 3.502 renders the loan
void and the debtor is not obligated to pay either the principal or finance charge, and if
he has paid any part thereof, he has a right to recover the payment. In addition, under
UCCC § 5.107 the repayment of an extortionate extension of credit is unenforceable
through civil judicial processes against the debtor. In UCCC § 6.113(1), the Admin-
istrator is given the power, after demand, to bring a civil action against a creditor
for making or collecting charges in excess of those permitted, which action may relate
to transactions with more than one debtor, and if it is found that an excess charge
has been made, the court shall order a refund to the debtor or debtors of the amount
of the excess charge. It might be argued from UCCC § 6.113, Comment 1, that only
the finance charge in excess of that allowed under UCCC § 3.508 comes under this
subsection. However, UCCC § 5.202(2) makes the whole finance charge and the
principal as a charge against the debtor, charges in excess of those allowed by the
UCCC. Thus such an interpretation appears to be an unduly literal reading without a
policy basis. For example, it would preclude use of UCCC § 6.113(1) to recover excess
delinquency, additional, and other types of charges. In addition there is support for the
broader reading in UCCC § 5.202(3) itself, which characterizes an amount in excess
of the lawful obligation under the agreement as an excess charge. Finally, UCCC §
6.113(1) can be construed to allow stay of the Administrator's action if the debtor sues
under either UCCC § 5.202(2) or §§ 5.202(3), (4), and since the statutes of limitations
are the same and UCCC § 5.202(2) is not denominated as a penalty, no other possible
inconsistency need result. As to the avoidance aspect of the relief, if it cannot be had
as an adjunct to the remedy under UCCC § 6.113(1), it certainly should be possible
under the wording of UCCC § 6.110, which allows an injunction and other appropriate
relief.
53. UCCC §§ 6.113(1), (2). UCCC § 6.113, Comment 4, states that an action
for a civil penalty under subsection (2) may be in lieu of or in addition to an action
for a refund under subsection (1), and so an argument for two civil penalties exists in
this situation. Again we meet, and defer, the problem surrounding the term willful, to
which is now added the question of the meaning of the terms "deliberate" and "reck-
less disregard" encountered in UCCC § 6.113(1).
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still need credit, 54 and since prior collection methods were not always
limited to legal means, the avoidance of the contracts might turn out to
be a remedy more illusory than real. Perhaps in situations such as this,
the best means to assure continued compliance with the statute would
be to incarcerate the persons involved. Since all of the described con-
duct would constitute a violation of the criminal provisions of the
UCCC r" this sanction would be available, and one could expect that
the prosecuting authority would not suffer any malaise in instituting the
appropriate proceedings."
At this point it is really too early accurately to assess the effective-
ness of the criminal provisions of the UCCC; the statute is a little over
three years old in Oklahoma, and one does not criminally prosecute
creditors for non-compliance without some breaking-in period. About
all that can be postulated is that the criminal provisions of -the UCCC
should not be dismissed as being of little utility because they have been
little used to date.
54. Consider the experience after the Supreme Court of Nebraska declared about
100 million dollars of obligations void a few years ago as described in Braucher, supra
note 10 at 908. During the interim when there was no law, collections kept up just
about the way they always had because people thought they might want credit again
some day. A similar thing happened in Oklahoma when the Department of Consumer
Affairs discovered a large number of loans made by a reputable company without the
required license; an overwhelming majority of the borrowers elected to pay the obli-
gation rather than regard their transaction as void.
55. A supervised lender who willfully makes charges in excess of those permitted
under UCCC art. 3 violates UCCC § 5.301(1). A person, other than a supervised fi-
nancial organization, who willfully engages in the business of making supervised loans
without a license violates UCCC § 5.301(2). And a person who willfully and know-
ingly fails to provide information which he is required to disclose or otherwise fails to
comply with any requirement of the provisions on disclosure and advertising violates
UCCC §§ 5.302(1), (3).
56. The Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs has experienced satisfac-
tory cooperation to the extent requested so far in connection with the situation dis-
cussed in note 50, supra. Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Ok-
lahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972. Further
support for the supposition advanced in the text can be found in the federal record.
There has been a plethora of prosecutions under the CCPA's "loan sharking" provi-
sions (18 U.S.C. §§ 891-94, 96 (1970)), which are similar to UCCC § 5.107 except
that they provide for criminal sanctions. See United States v. Keresty, 465 F.2d 36 (3d
Cir. 1972); United States v. DeLutro, 435 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 983 (1971); United States v. Fiore, 434 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 973 (1971); United States v. DeStafano, 429 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971); United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1970), affd,
402 U.S. 146 (1971); United States v. Biancofiori, 422 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942 (1970); United States v. Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351 (D. Conn.
1970); United States v. Markowitz, 4 CCH CONSUMEa CREnrr GUME 99,731
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1970); United States v. Schulman, 4 CCH CONSUMER CR.rr
GumB 99,754 (S.D.N.Y. April 17, 1970). Compare this with the record evidenced
in note 34, supra.
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SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS OF THE UCCC
There are a number of UCCC sections that expressly or impliedly
declare that conduct or a contractual instrument in contravention of
their provisions is ineffective; that is to say, since no ancillary affirma-
tive action need be taken to reach this result, they are self-executing.
Indicative of the type are the provisions that stipulate (1) that an agree-
ment by a buyer, lessee, or debtor with respect to a consumer credit
sale, a consumer lease, a consumer loan, or a modification thereof to
which the UCCC applies, that the law of another state shall apply, or
that the buyer, lessee, or debtor consents to the jurisdiction of another
state, or that fixes venue, is invalid;57 (2) that an agreement by the buyer
or lessee with respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease not
to assert against an assignee a claim or defense arising out of the sale or
lease is unenforceable;5 8 or (3) that a security interest taken by a seller in
a consumer credit sale, other than in the property sold, other than in
goods upon which services are performed or in which goods sold are
installed or to which they are annexed when the debt secured is three
hundred dollars or more, and other than in land to which the goods
are affixed or which is maintained, repaired, or improved as a result
of the sale of the goods or services when the debt secured is one thousand
dollars or more, is void; 59 (4) that a security interest taken by a lessor
with respect to a consumer lease or a security interest taken in an in-
terest in land to secure a consumer loan bearing a rate of finance charge
in excess of eighteen percent per year and in which the principal is one
thousand dollars or less, is void;60 (5) that an irrevocable assignment of
the earnings of a buyer, lessee, or debtor for payment or as security for
payment of a debt arising out of a consumer credit sale, a consumer
lease, or a consumer loan is unenforceable; 61 (6) that an agreement by
the buyer, lessee, or debtor in a consumer credit sale, consumer lease,
or consumer loan for the payment of attorney's fees is unenforceable;0 2
57. UCCC § 1.201(9) (except as otherwise provided in UCCC § 1.201(8)).
58. UCCC § 2.404, Alternative A. The rule does not extend to a sale or lease
primarily for an agricultural purpose. UCCC § 2.404, Alternative B, allows limited en-
forceability of such a provision only if certain preconditions are met.
59. UCCC §§ 2.407(1), (3). The rule does not apply to a security interest
taken by the seller in any property of the buyer to secure the debt arising from a
consumer credit sale primarily for an agricultural purpose, and is subject to the provi-
sions on cross-collateralization in UCCC § 2.408.
60. UCCC §§ 2.407(2) (other than a lease primarily for an agricultural purpose),
3.510.
61. UCCC §§ 2.410, 3.403.
62. UCCC §§ 2.413, Alternative A and 3.404, Alternative A. Under UCCC §§
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(7) that an agreement with respect to a consumer credit sale or a con-
sumer loan that provides for any charges as a result of default by the
buyer or debtor other than reasonable expenses incurred in realizing on
a security interest, delinquency charges, and attorney's fees, as allowed,
is unenforceable;6 3 (8) that an authorization to any person to confess
judgment on a claim arising out of a consumer credit sale, a consumer
lease, or a consumer loan is void; 4 (9) that a creditor may not attach
unpaid earnings of a debtor by garnishment or like proceedings prior to
the entry of judgment in an action against the debtor for a debt arising
from a consumer credit sale, a consumer lease, or a consumer loan;65
and (10) that no court may make, execute, or enforce an order or
process which subjects to garnishment to enforce payment of a judgment
arising from a consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan
any more of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any
workweek than the lesser of twenty-five percent of the individuals dis-
posable earnings for that week or the amount by which his disposable
earnings for that week exceed forty times the federal minimum hourly
wage.
06
The published comment on the effectiveness of these and other
similar provisions from the standpoint of enforcement has been some-
what spotty and, for the most part, unfavorable.
There are many other ways of potential violations, such as use of
. . . clauses assigning earnings, confessing judgment, waiving de-
fenses and providing unreasonable attorney's fees and default
charges . . . . Although these practices are prohibited and reg-
ulated and many such clauses are expressly voided, they are outside
the "Debtor's Remedies" sections. Assuming that the statutory
prohibitions do not merely create defenses, but also create a right
of action for reformation of the contract or a declaratory judgment,
the remedy is simply the striking of the prohibited clause. Thus
there is no penalty through private enforcement actions attached
to the continued use of such clauses for "in terrorem" value. The
consumer will not be compensated for his investment of time and
money, if he attacks such use on his own initiative, even if litigation
is necessary.
67
2.413, Alternative B and 3.404, Alternative B, such an agreement is enforceable within
specified limitations and note, in that event, UCCO § 3.514. It would not appear that
any of these limitations apply in connection with attorney's fees recoverable by statute.
In Oklahoma, for example, see OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 936 (Supp. 1972).
63. UCCC § 2.414, 3.405.
64. UCCC 99 2.415, 3.407.
65. UCCC § 5.104.
66. UCCC § 5.105. That amount is presently sixty-four dollars.
67. Spanogle, supra note 10, at 1045.
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That is to say, such UCCC provisions are entirely adequate so long as
everyone abides by the statutory mandate, but there are reasons for us-
ing the prohibited clauses or for engaging in the prohibited conduct,
and when that happens the prognostication is not a reassuring one.
The accuracy of this prediction seemingly bore fruit in Oldham v.
Oldham,68 which was a case brought by a wage earner against his
creditor for damages consisting of the loss of his rightful earnings,
damage to his reputation in the community, and exemplary damages
stemming from a garnishment of his wages allegedly in violation of
Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) section 1673, which is a
provision substantially similar to UCCC section 5.105. The court dis-
missed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted on the basis that the CCPA makes no provision for a private
civil action to enforce its garnishment restriction provisions. The same
decision would undoubtedly be correct under the UCCC. 0 Thus at
this point the UCCC appears to be little more than a precatory ad-
monition, but such an initial appearance in this context, it is submitted,
is deceiving.
The UCCC Administrator has considerable power both to halt and
to penalize violations of the statute.70  Thus, an aggrieved debtor need
only request the invocation of that power. That task is not difficult.
The Administrator may receive and act on complaints, take action de-
signed to obtain voluntary compliance, or commence proceedings on his
own initiative.71 Oklahoma consumers in significant numbers have filed
complaints with the Oklahoma Administrator concerning alleged viola-
tions of the type of provisions under discussion.72 In the vast majority
of these cases the complaints have been resolved by conferences with the
creditors involved after the fact of the violation has been established.
68. 337 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
69. See UCCO §§ 5.105(3), 5.202.
70. In the context involved, see, e.g., UCCC § 6.110 (power to bring a civil ac-
tion to restrain violations and for other appropriate relief) and UCCO § 6.113(2)
(power to bring a civil action to recover a civil penalty for repeated and willful viola-
tions).
71. UCCC § 6.104(1)(a).
72. Complaints have been received involving garnishment, improper security in-
terests, agreements that the law of another state shall apply, and improper default
charges. In some instances, there have been no complaints because of the provisions
of the OxLA om& UCCC; for example, Oklahoma did not prohibit waiver of defenses
clauses or agreements for attorney's fees. OLAHoMA UCCC §§ 2-404, 2-413, 3-404.
In other instances, the conduct prohibited by the UCCC was already not engaged in
under prior law, such as in the case of cognovit clauses. 1970 ANNUAL R'oRT 15-16;
1971 AN.rNUAL REPORT 9.
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This has customarily resulted in voluntary compliance, and future ac-
tions are remedied by form changes and the discontinuance of the con-
duct that caused the violation without the need for the Administrator
actually to commence further proceedings.7 In the event that more is
needed, however, these situations are precisely the ones in which the
Administrator should be inclined to act, because an effective private
right of action under the statute is generally unavailable to the con-
sumers concerned.
74
The absence of such a private right of action under the UCCC
75
should not, however, be equated with the absence of any such right of
action in the consumer whatsoever. To illustrate, the situation that
obtained in the Oldham case,76 which could arise under UCCC section
73. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 7; 1972 ANNUAL REPORT 9-10.
74. For example, in Oklahoma the Administrator has filed eight civil actions to
date. One of those was in connection with a failure by a creditor to file notifications
and pay fees which, as we have discussed, is basically an administrative matter. See
text accompanying notes 43-44 supra. One involved a massive violation, in terms of
dollar amounts, by an unlicensed lender. However, the action was limited to a claim
under OLntAuozA UCCC § 6-113(2), for the purpose of deterrence and to establish that
a violation had occurred, since the consumers involved had an adequate private right
of action. See OoLAomA UCCC § 5-202(2). Two involved such difficult questions
of law, and concerned problems of such widespread applicability, that the Adminis-
trator decided to sue even though theoretically the consumers had an adequate civil
remedy to recover the alleged excess charges involved. The four remaining actions
were brought by the Administrator (three of them involved unconscionable contracts
and one a loan shark type operation) as least in part because, even though the con-
sumers had a civil remedy under the Oklahoma UCCC (see OoLAHOmA UCCC §
5-108, 5-107, 5-202(2)), it was believed under the circumstances involved that other-
wise the objectionable conduct might not be pursued. In one of the unconscionability
cases, however, a private action was brought. Interview with James A. McCaffrey,
General Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec.
19, 1972.
75. It should perhaps still be an open question Whether consumers, in connection
with the provisions under discussion, do not really have effective enough private re-
lief pursuant to the UCCC. The only reported case under the UCCC to date is Sanco
Enterprises, Inc. v. Christian, 495 P.2d 404 (Okla. 1972), which involved a provi-
sion of the type under discussion (UCCC § 5.103, which in substance prohibits a seller
in a consumer credit sale where the cash price of the goods or services was $1000 or
less from both repossessing and also obtaining a deficiency) and in which $480 was at
stake. The consumer hired an attorney and fought it out to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. In addition, an Oklahoma attorney informs me he has handled several such
cases unreported. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Columbia Credit Corp., - Colo. -, 499
P.2d 1163 (1972), which involved the garnishment restrictions of CCPA § 1673,
which are, for our purposes, substantially similar to those of UCCC § 5.105. Of
course, several such cases are hardly conclusive, but it does demonstrate the danger
of flat assertions of ineffectiveness. Then, too, there is at least some argument that
the provision allowing a consumer to recover reasonable attorney's fees in any case
in which it is found that a creditor has violated the UCCC (UCCC § 5.202(8)) is
of general application, and is not limited to the situations enumerated in UCCC § 5.202
where the consumer is given an express right of action.
76. 337 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
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5.105, is not dissimilar to that which could occur under any basic
exemption statute.77  It has long been settled that if exempt property is
seized and applied to the payment of a judgment, the owner may have
his action against the wrongdoer, unless such exemption is waived 78 by
some act or omission of the debtor .7  Thus it would appear that the
remedy that the debtor might seek in an Oldham-type case in a UCCC
state should certainly be obtainable, albeit outside the UCCC itself.8
Furthermore, if a little research were done, a non-UCCC civil remedy
might be found for the violation of most, if not all, of the self-executing
provisions of the UCCC.
Thus, a creditor who attaches the unpaid earnings of a debtor by
garnishment prior to the entry of judgment in violation of UCCC sec-
tion 5.104 may arguably be liable in damages for a violation of the
debtor's civil rights.8 1  And if a creditor who validly repossesses an
automobile in which he has a security interest is nonetheless liable in
conversion for taking personal property located in the automobile in
which he has no security interest, 2 the same principle would seem to
require that a creditor who repossesses under a security interest that is
void under UCCC section 2.407 should be liable for conversion as well.
Present experience suggests that, on the whole, the self-executing
provisions of the UCCC are not paper tigers and that compliance with
77. UCCC § 5.105 is not a basic exemption statute since it complements rather
than displaces local garnishment laws, but that in no way detracts from its essential
character as a type of debtor exemption. See UCCC § 5.105 Comments 2, 3, 5.
78. SeeUCC § 1.107(1).
79. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Treitschke, 17 Neb. 205, 22 N.W. 418 (1885).
80. Moreover, punitive damages can be awarded. See, e.g., Barlow v. Ritchie,
105 Okla. 257, 232 P. 391 (1925). As a practical matter, the availability of such
damages will provide an incentive for the action, if one is needed, and may cover the at-
torney's fees involved if the recovery sought is achieved. Cf. Spanogle, supra note
9, at 650, who suggests that a consumer may have no right of action outside of the
UCCC, where that statute explicitly undertakes to regulate certain conduct but refuses
the consumer an express remedy in connection therewith, under a preemption theory. I
think not. See UCCC §§ 1.103, 5.202, Comment 4.
81. See, e.g., McMeans v. Schwartz, 330 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D. Ala. 1971), holding,
in an action for declaratory relief and money damages under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1971), with respect to prejudgment garnishment taken on
plaintiff's wages, that prejudgment garnishment was state action, that the plaintiff in
garnishment was acting under color of state law, and that the prejudgment garnishment
law involved was violative of due process and to that extent invalid. A possible hur-
dle in the context pnder discussion of course would be that under the UCCC state law
prohibits prejudgment garnishment.
82. See, e.g., Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp., 439 F.2d 1303, (10th Cir.
1971) and Varela v. Wells Fargo Bank, 5 Cal. App. 2d 741, 93 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1971).
Punitive damages are recoverable. Compare Klingbiel, 439 F.2d at 308-10. Compare
with Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 324 F. Supp. 108 (D.S.C. 1971).
UCCC ENFORCEMENT
the various statutory mandates can generally be expected, even though
that compliance may be partially induced by the presence of several big
sticks in the background. However, the fact remains that administra-
tively initiated enforcement of such provisions, apart from voluntary
compliance, must be practically" or legally8 4 selective and that private
enforcement of these provisions will not actually be undertaken in a
substantial number of cases because of insufficient incentives5 or a
questionable chance for recovery outside the statute.8 6 Such factors
suggest room for improvement. In that regard, it is clear that the
provisions of the Revised Uniform Consumer Credit Code (RUCCC)
offer a more satisfactory approach. 8 7 They provide for a private right
of action with a recovery of actual damages and, in addition, 8 a penalty
in an amount determined by the court of not less than one hundred
dollars nor more than one thousand dollars for violation, for example,
of the provisions applying to (1) restrictions on interests in land as
security,89 (2) attorney's fees, 0 (3) security in sales and leases, 1 (4)
assignments of earnings,92 (5) authorizations to confess judgment,93 (6)
assignees subject to defenses,94 and (7) limitations on default charges.9 5
SELF-HELP PROVISIONS oF THE UCCC
Closely related to the self-executing provisions of the UCCC, but
primarily differentiated from them by the necessity for some affirmative
action by the consumer, before the remedy provided by the statute
comes into play, are a number of provisions that can be labeled as "self-
help provisions." Included in this category are (1) the right of a con-
sumer to refinance the amount of a balloon payment at the time it is
83. See text following note 44, supra.
84. Under UCCC § 6.113(2), a civil penalty may be imposed only if the court
finds that the defendant has engaged in a course of repeated and willful violations.
85. See note 75, supra. An argument over whether effective enough private re-
lief pursuant to the UCCC now prevails does not deny that there will be cases where
private action will not be pursued.
86. See notes 81-82, supra.
87. See RUCCC § 5.201(1). In addition, if a violation is found, reasonable at-
torney's fees and the costs of the action shall be awarded. RUCCC § 5.201(9).
88. The additional penalty is available under the provisions of the RUCCC if
the action is one other than a class action.
89. RUCCC § 2.307 (UCCC § 3.510).
90. RUCCC § 2.507 (UCCC H9 2.413, 3A04, 3.514).
91. RUCCC § 3.301 (UCC § 2.407).
92. RUCCC § 3.305 (UCCC § 2.410, 3.403).
93. RUCCC § 3.306 (UCCC H9 2.415, 3.407).
94. RUCCC § 3.404 (UCCC § 2.404).
95. RUCCC § 3.402 (UCCC § 2.414 and 3.405).
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due without penalty and on terms no less favorable to the consumer
than the terms of the original transaction; 6 (2) the right of a buyer
or lessee in a consumer credit sale or consumer lease induced by a
referral scheme to rescind the agreement or retain the goods delivered
and the benefit of any services performed without any obligation to pay
for them;97 (3) the right of a buyer to cancel a home solicitation sale 8
until midnight of the third business day after the day on which the
buyer signs an agreement or offer to purchase which complies with the
statute;99 (4) the right of a consumer to rescind a consumer credit sale
or consumer loan with respect to which a security interest is retained
or acquired in an interest in land that is used or expected to be used
as his residence until midnight of the third business day following the
consummation of the transaction or the delivery of notice of the right
and all other applicable disclosures, whichever is later;100 and (5) the
right of a buyer or lessee with respect to a consumer credit sale or
consumer lease101 to assert against an assignee, not related to the seller
or lessor and who acquires the buyer's or lessee's contract in good
faith and for value, a claim or defense arising out of the sale or lease,
notwithstanding an agreement by the buyer or lessee not to do so, if
the buyer or lessee gives written notice to the assignee of the facts
giving rise to his claim or defense within three months after the as-
signee has mailed to the buyer or lessee a notice of the assignment that
complies with the statute. 0
These provisions are obviously subject to much the same criticism
that is leveled at the self-executing provisions previously discussed. 08
96. Thus, a balloon payment is unenforceable on its original terms against a debtor
who elects to refinance it. UCCC § 2.405, 3.402. This right does not extend to a
consumer credit sale or a consumer loan primarily for an agricultural purpose or pur-
suant to open end credit, nor does it apply to the extent that the payment schedule
is adjusted to the seasonal or irregular income of the debtor.
97. An agreement induced by a referral is unenforceable and the consumer can
either retain the goods sold or the benefit of services rendered without obligation,
or rescind the agreement, return the goods, and recover any payment. UCCO § 2.411.
98. UCCC § 2.501.
99. UCCC § 2.502(1).
100. UCCC § 5.204.
101. This section does not apply to a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural pur-
pose. UCCC § 2.404.
102. Thus, the waiver of defenses clause is not enforceable against a debtor who
gives timely notice to the assignee of his obligation. It is also not enforceable with
respect to claims or defenses arising after the end of the three-month period after no-
tice was mailed. UCCC § 2.404, Alternative B.
103. See Spanogle, Why Does The Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Es-
chew Private Enforcement?, supra note 10, at 1045. Spanogle specifically mentions
balloon notes and home solication sales, and no doubt would have included referral
1246 [Vol. 51
1973] UCCC ENFORCEMENT 1247
The answer to such criticism must be much the same: administratively
initiated enforcement is available, 10 4 and the consumer may also obtain
relief through a privately brought action."0 5 But, in addition, another
sales except that such transactions were subject to a different treatment under the draft
of the UCCC which he was discussing.
104. See notes 70-71 supra. The Oklahoma Administrator has received numerous
complaints involving the self-help provisions. The largest number over the period
has been in connection with the buyer's right to cancel a home solicitation sale;
in that category, for example, there were 128 complaints in 1972. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT
15-16: 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 7; 1972 ANNUAL REPORT 9. As to the enforcement
measures necessary to resolve these complaints, see note 73 supra.
105. There are no such reported cases in Oklahoma as yet concerning these sec-
tions. However, a consumer class action has been instituted with respect to a creditor
allegedly making referral home solicitation sales. Also, UCCC § 5.204, concerning
the right to rescind a transaction with respect to which a security interest is retained
or acquired in the consumer's home, is a carbon copy of CCPA § 1635, and so the ex-
perience under the latter section should be largely transferable. That experience indi-
cates that consumers are apparently willing to take up the cudgel concerning their rights
in this area through the vehicle of a civil action. Thus, in Young v. Tri-City Remod-
eling Enterprises, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 108, 335 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Albany City Ct. 1972),
the consumer sued to establish her right to rescind a contract to have certain roofing
work done on her home and to recover her downpayment which the seller refused to re-
turn on the ground he was entitled to it under a liquidated damages clause in the
contract. The consumer lost under CCPA § 1635 as the contract bore no finance
charge and was payable $692 down with the balance due on completion, thus re-
moving the transaction from the category of a consumer credit transaction. Compare
Regulation Z §§ 226.9(a) and 226.2(k) (CCPA § 1635 is supplemented by Regulation
Z, § 226.9, reprinted at 1 CCH CONSUMER CREnrr GumE 3585-3591. See CCPA §§
1635(a), (d), 1604; whether or not it is also expanded by Regulation Z was until recently
a matter of litigation. Compare, e.g., Gardner & North Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 464 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972), with N.C. Freed
Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., - F. Supp. -, 4 CCH CoNstlnfR
CREDIrr GumE f 99,356 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1971)) rev'd - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1973), 4
CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GumE 1 99,079 with UCCC § 5.204(1), 2.104(1)(d), 1.201
(12). In Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Alas. 1971), rev'd,
469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972), the consumer sued to establish her mortgage placed
on their residence to secure an extension of credit made with respect to a past due
obligation which they had incurred on rental property which they purchased and
owned as an investment, as well as other relief. They lost because the transaction was
entered into for a business purpose and thus was not a consumer credit trans-
action. Compare CCPA §§ 1635(a), 1603(1) with UCCC §§ 5.204(1), 3.104(1)(b).
In Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1971), the
consumer sued to establish a right to rescind retail installment contracts which contained
confession of judgment provisions, as well as for other relief. See the discussion con-
cerning Douglas, supra. The consumer lost on this point because the contracts also con-
tained an effective waiver of all rights to make a judgment a confessed lien on any real
property owned by the buyer. See 12 C.F.R., 262,2620 (1972). But see UCCC §§
5.204(1), 3.407. In Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970), the
consumer sued on a disclosure violation in connection with the purchase and installa-
tion of a swimming pool, an action which apparently would also establish her right
to rescind the transaction as she had elected to do. In an election of remedies analysis,
the court held that the consumer who rescinded the transaction was not among the class
protected by the civil liability section of the CCPA. For a critical comment on the
case, see Comment, Private Remedies Under the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Relation-
ship Between Rescission and Civil Liability, 57 IowA L. REV. 199 (1971). Finally, a
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type of censure has been aimed at the self-help provisions of the UCCC
on the ground that a consumer cannot be expected to help himself by in-
voking the statutorily provided relief unless he has both knowledge and
an appreciation of his legal rights. Thus, for example, one commentator
reports: "[Consumer interests] argue that the notice [of assignment in
conjunction with a waiver of defenses clause] from the assignee in all
probability will not be read, and that if it is read, in all probability it
will not be understood."' 10 6
By and large, the UCCC adequately assures that the consumer will
obtain notice of his remedy in connection with the self-help provisions.
First, each of the provisions giving the right to cancel a home solicita-
tion sale, the right to rescind a transaction with respect to which a
security interest is retained or acquired in the consumer's residence,
and the right to assert claims and defenses arising out of the sale or
lease transaction against an assignee specifically provides for notice at
an appropriate time in the transaction, 0 7 and while the provisions on
balloon payments do not specifically provide for such notice, disclosure
of the right to refinance is required elsewhere.' 08 The one exception
is in referral transactions. Of course, it would be nonsense to require
in that situation that the creditor must provide the debtor with a state-
ment that the agreement is unenforceable and that he has a right to
retain the goods delivered and the benefit of any services performed
without any obligation *to pay for them, but it is perhaps equal non-
sense to create a sanction that is generally unknown. 10 A persuasive
private right of action may exist outside of the UCCC with respect to some or all of
these sections. See, e.g., Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit
Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, supra note 10, at 1049. The RUCCC, to date, has
made no revisions in connection with the remedies in this area.
106. Robertson, Consumer Protections Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
41 Miss. L.J. 36, 56 (1969).
107. UCCC §§ 2.503, 5.204(1), 2.404(1) Alternative B. The details of the no-
tice required by UCCC § 5.204(1) are left to rules to be adopted by the Administrator
pursuant to UCCC §§ 6.104(1) (e), (2). These rules, where promulgated in a UCCC
state, have closely followed the provisions of Regulation Z, § 226.9; see, e.g., Oklahoma
Regulation Z, § 226.9, 3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Oklahoma) 6621-28.
108. UCCC §§ 2.306(2)(1), 3.306(2)(i), 6.104(2), and Regulation Z, § 226.8
(b) (3). As to the supplement of the UCCC by Regulation Z as a state rule, see Mil-
ler, supra note 25.
109. An effective general program of consumer credit education can be expected to
help here in time. The UCCC Administrator is given the power to establish programs
for the education of consumers with respect to credit practices and problems under
UCCC § 6.104(1)(c). However, this will have little impact in the short run, and even
in the long run it is doubtful whether any general knowledge will be as good as a spe-
cific notice in connection with the actual transaction. To illustrate, Oklahoma has
had an excellent program of consumer credit education almost from the beginning.
Since July 1, 1970, efforts aimed at all educational levels including elementary,
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argument can be made that the referral transactions provision of the
UCCC would be more effective if only a right to cancel were provided,
coupled with a notice requirement, such as in the home solicitation
sales provisions.110
Secondly, the sanctions for the failure to give notice where notice
is called for generally seem satisfactory enough to assure widespread
creditor compliance. A failure to disclose in connection with a balloon
payment may generate a liability equal to twice the amount of the
finance charge but not less than one hundred dollars nor more than
one thousand dollars."1  The absence of or improper notice of assign-
ment allows claims or defenses arising out of the sale or lease to be as-
serted. 112 And the absence of or improper notice of the right to cancel
secondary, college and adult, and consisting of, among other things, the develop-
ment of resource and teaching units designed to implement the formal study of
the UCCC, addresses to various consumer, business, professional and educational
groups estimated to have reached 10,000 Oklahomans, and a mobile educational
center with audio-visual presentations which attracted over 250,000 people, have been
carried on. Nonetheless, during 1972, the Oklahoma Administrator received only 10
complaints concerning referral sales while receiving 128 concerning the buyer's
right to cancel. 1972 ANNUAL REPORT 9-12; cf. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 15-16, which
showed no complaints on referral sales and seventy-five on home solicitation sales. Of
course, it is unknown how many referral sales are actually being made in Oklahoma,
but even conceding that the present referral sale provision is doing a reasonable job,
which may be an unwarranted assumption based on my conversations with practicing
attorneys, the figures still seem significant from the standpoint of the likelihood of
consumer knowledge.
110. One probably insoluble problem with this approach, however, is that the
cancellation period would have to be unduly long to assure thtat the referral scheme
was or was not working as promised. Perhaps a better approach would be to increase
the sanction for using these schemes even further by providing a private right of action
for damages in addition to the unenforceability of the contract.
111. UCCC § 5.203(1) (a). Moreover, since under UCCC § 1.107(1), except as
otherwise provided in the statute, a buyer, lessee, or debtor may not waive or agree
to forego rights or benefits under the UCCC, and since the above sanction is only
for the failure to disclose, it would appear the debtor in a balloon payment situation
would retain the right to refinance without penalty on terms no less favorable than those
of the original transaction, and thus should be able to recover any penalty paid or
charges imposed in excess of those involved in the original transaction, or the value of
any property lost due to a default on the balloon payment, as the case may be, from
the creditor. See UCCC H8 5.202(3), 1.103. This line of thought perhaps lends more
credence to the referral provision of UCCC § 2.411, since a debtor could always presum-
ably recover any payment, but in such situaions the seller is not always around, it is at
least open to question whether an excess charge is involved and thus whether any ex-
press provision for recovery from an assignee exists even without worrying about the
effect of UCCC § 2.404 Alternative B; see UCCC § 5.202(3). What the consumer
needs here is not a lawsuit at the end but effective relief at the beginning.
112. UCCC § 2.404 Alternative B. Is it perhaps also arguable that any failure to
give notice removes the limitation in UCCC § 2.404(3) Alternative B that the claim
or defense is only utilizable as a matter of defense or setoff? Cf. Warren, Comments
on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rtv. 1065 (1971).
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or to rescind extends the right to cancel or to rescind indefinitely.1 '
Finally, all notices required to be given must be conspicuous. Thus
the statement of the buyer's rights in a home-solicitation sale must ap-
pear under the conspicuous caption, "BUYER'S RIGHT TO CAN-
113. UCCC § 2.503(3), 5.204(1); cf. the recommendation of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System to Congress to amend the CCPA to provide a
limitation on the time the right of rescission may run under CCPA § 1635, from which
section UCCC § 5.204 was derived. FED. RESERvE BD., ANNUAL REPORT To CONGRESS
ON TRuTa IN LENDING FOR THE YEA 1971, at 19 (1972). Characterizing, upon can-
cellation or rescission, anything retained by the creditor as an excess charge would re-
sult in the imposition of no limitation under UCCC §§ 5.202(3), 5.205. But because
UCCC H§ 2.503(3), 5.204(1), 5.204(2) seem to contain their own remedies, it is per-
haps questionable whether such retention should be so characterized. Moreover, under
the UCCC it is clear that a failure to give the required notice of the right to cancel
or to rescind results in no disclosure violation under UCCC § 5.203(1), but whether
for the failure to give other required disclosures the consumer can both cancel or re-
scind and also recover for a disclosure violation is still an open question. See note 105
discussion the Bostwick case, supra. One more substantial problem remains concern-
ing the sanction for absence of or an improper notice. To illustrate, consider the sit-
uation where a plumbing and heating contractor enters into a consumer credit sale
of a heating or an air conditioning system to a debtor under circumstances where a
security interest is retained or acquired in the residence of the debtor, no notice of
the right to rescind is provided, and the work is completed. This was the situation in
In re Fabbis, Inc., 4 CCEI CONSUMER CRsrr Gum 99,114 (FTC Docket No. 8833,
Nov. 14, 1972). If the goods cannot be removed without their destruction or damage
and substantial loss to the realty, what should transpire? One possibility is to accord
the right to rescind and, if the debtor decides to exercise it, allow tender in kind in
place and the removal of the goods, and if removal is accomplished, require a pay-
ment equal to any value the debtor may have lost. UCCC § 5.204(2). Thus, perhaps
a new furnace could be removed and the debtor awarded sufficient funds to buy and
install a used one approximately equal to his original furnace, which funds he could
use for that purpose or toward the purchase of a new one on better terms. But if the
work completed involved a new roof, for example, problems arise, since presumably
there is no such thing as a used roof and thus rescission could leave the debtor with
no roof and too short for a new one on terms he can obtain, and consequently no true
option would exist. Moreover, UCCC § 5.204(2) provides that if return of the prop-
erty in kind would be impractical or inequitable, the debtor shall tender its reason-
able value, which seems to argue against tender in kind in place. That last provision
gets us to a second possibility. If UCCC § 5.204 is read literally, the answer to this
sort of situation appears to be that upon rescission the debtor owes the creditor the
reasonable value of the property, the security interest is void, and the debtor is not
liable for any finance or other charge. But this interpretation has numerous prob-
lems. For one, it practically eviscerates the right to rescind the transaction since the
debtor is not returned to his original position but still owes a substantial debt. Sec-
ond, on what terms does he owe that debt, immediately or over some period of time, and
if so, how long and at what finance charge? Third, this is an illusory remedy if he
defaults in payment since the creditor can get a judgment and thus a judgment lien on the
residence, unless the homestead laws would prevent this. In Oklahoma, for example,
they might not since the urban homestead is limited in value and the exemption for
the homestead does not apply where the debt is due for work and material used in
constructing improvements thereon. OKI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 H8 2, 5 (1955). In
short, this possibility is entirely unacceptable since it allows the creditor to benefit in
substantially the same way he would have, had he obeyed the statute. Perhaps the only
truly effective resolution of the problem is to grant the right to rescind and, if the debtor
elects to exercise it, allow him to retain the goods without obligation on his part to
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CEL,"'1 4 and the notice of the right to rescind must be printed in capital
and lowercase letters of not less than twelve-point bold-faced type on
one side of a separate statement that identifies the transaction to which
it relates." 5 The notice of assignment must be in writing and contain a
conspicuous notice to the buyer or lessee concerning his right to notify
the assignee," 6 and disclosure of a balloon payment must be made
clearly and conspicuously."17 It is difficult to envisage what more could
be done to bring notice of his legal rights to the consumer's attention.
pay for them. This, more than anything else, would assure notice of the right to rescind
being given, is not duly harsh considering that in other circumstances the debtor can
also become the owner of the property without obligation to pay for it (see UCCC §
5.204(2)), and can perhaps overcome the provision, that if return of the property in
kind would be impractical or inequitable the debtor shall tender its reasonable value, by
the argument that some sanction must be deemed to occur for a violation of Regulation
Z § 22.69(c), which should exist as an Administrator's rule pursuant to UCCC 99
5.204 and 6.104(1)(e), (2). Further support for this resolution of the matter can be
garnered from a consideration of the case where the rescindable transaction also consti-
tutes a home solicitation sale. In such an instance, the debtor has an election of the ap-
propriate sections. UCCC § 2.502(6). UCCC § 2.505(1) provides that upon can-
cellation, the buyer, upon demand, must tender any goods delivered. In the context un-
der discussion, and in the absence of the concept of a tender in kind in place, which
one gathers was no more contemplated here than it was in UCCC § 5.204, he can-
not do that. Thus, the statute has omitted this situation, and a remedy must be fa-
shioned. It is at least reasonable that a solution similar to that stipulated in UCCC §
2.505(3), where if the seller has performed any services prior to cancellation the seller
is entitled to no compensation for them, other than a possible cancellation fee,
would be adopted. Parenthetically, the same ought to hold true for the infrequent,
but possible, case of a home solicitation sale of, for example, food, where the food is
consumed prior to cancellation. Finally, if the consumer had paid cash for the im-
provement work obtained by a consumer loan coupled with a lien on his home to fi-
nance the payment, to hold that upon rescission the consumer owes the principal to
the lender produces defeating consequences similar to requiring a buyer in a credit sale
situation to tender the reasonable value of the property. Accordingly, the result
should be the same as in the credit sale case, an ability to rescind without obligation on
the loan, and for a similar reason. See Regulation Z § 226.9(c). Moreover, this
resolution should not be mitigated by applying the reasoning of those usurious mortgage
loan cases which render the loan void but require the debtor to pay at least the prin-
cipal thereof to obtain equitable relief removing the lien of record (see G. OSBORNE,
MORTGAGES § 111 (1950)), since UCCC § 5.204(2) explicitly indicates that upon re-
scission the creditor shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termina-
tion of any security interest. It must be noted in summary, however, that the advocated
solution in a theoretical sense, as opposed to what makes the best remedy under the
sections as now written, is not really satisfactory, since it is far too harsh. Revision is
in order, and one suggestion might be that the consumer owes the reasonable value of
the goods or the principal and has a right to finance that debt with the creditor on
terms no less favorable than in the original transaction, except that no lien can be ob-
tained in the consumer's residence to secure or enforce the debt. Cf. Note, Truth In
Lending: Problems with the Right of Rescission, 7 WriLA TE= W. 119 (1971).
114. UCCC § 2.503(2) (a).
115. Regulation Z § 225.9(b).
116. UCCC § 2.404(1) Alternative B.
117. Regulation Z § 226.6(a). This should be a part of an Administrator's rule
pursuant to the direction of UCCC § 6.104(2).
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In this light, arguments against the provisions on the ground that the
notices will not be read are subject to the all-too-accurate observation
"[that] any law which requires intelligent, affirmative action on the part
of the consumer is [too frequently viewed as] a creditor-oriented law."118
Assuring appreciation or understanding of the situation called to
the consumer's attention in the notice is perhaps another matter. In
this respect, the UCCC stipulates the exact wording that must appear in
a valid notice of the rights to cancel and to rescind in order to pre-
vent any obfuscation that might stem from variations in language or
from over- or under-description of the rights involved.119 And while the
precise wording for the notice of assignment or the disclosure of a balloon
payment is generally not spelled out, the statute specifically requires
enough detail so that appreciation of what is being communicated should
not be an atypical result.120 In the end, this problem of understanding
is not unique to the context involved,' 2 ' and perhaps all that is possible
is to set up a statutory scheme that is reasonably sure to provide com-
prehension to the large majority of consumers involved.' 22  The UCCC
118. Robertson, supra note 106, at 56.
119. UCCC §§ 2.503, 5.204(1) and Regulation Z § 226.9(b). A converse bene-
fit of this approach to the creditor is that if he follows the statutory direction he is
absolutely assured of a valid notice.
120. UCCC § 2.404(1), Alternative B, provides that the notice of assignment shall
be in writing and addressed to the buyer or lessee at this address as stated in the con-
tract, identify the contract, describe the goods or services, state the names of the seller
or lessor and buyer or lessee and the number, amounts and due dates of the install-
ments, and contain a conspicuous notice to the buyer or lessee that he has three months
within which to notify the assignee in writing of any complaints, claims or defenses he
may have against the seller or lessor and that if written notification of the complaints,
claims or defenses is not received by the assignee within the 3-month period, the as-
signee will have the right to enforce the contract free of any claims or defenses the buyer
or lessee may have against the seller or lessor which have arisen before the end of the
three-month period after notice was mailed. UCCC § 6.104(2) and Regulation Z §
226.8(b) (3) provide that if any payment is more than twice the amount of an otherwise
regularly scheduled equal payment, the creditor shall identify the amount of such pay-
ment by the term "balloon payment" and shall state the conditions, if any, under which
that payment may be refinanced if not paid when due.
121. For example, the same problem manifests itself in connection with disclaimers
of implied warranties under § 2.316 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Miller,
The Crossroads: The Case for the Code in Products Liability, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 411,
445-46 (1968).
122. It is generally recognized that the idea of disclosure in consumer credit is not
uniformly valuable to all consumers. That does not mean it is not worthwhile. See
H. KY-,KE, CONSUMER CRDrr 49-54 (1970); Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A
Narrative of Federal Test Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 57 IowA L. Rav. 955,
957-58 (1972); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint,
68 CoLum. L. Rnv. 445, 445-69 (1968). It may even be a great deal more worth-
while than many commentators presently think; the complete story on this one has not
yet been written. See Miller, An Alternative Response to the Supposed Direct Loan
Loophole in the UCCC, 24 OK.A. L. Rnv. 427, 453-54 (1971).
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certainly does this, and in addition it should be noted that the UCCC
Administrator is always available to assist in interpreting the meaning
of any notice123 and to prevent attempts to lessen appreciation of the
message conveyed.1
24
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE UCCC
Many commentators are of the opinion that the administrative
provisions are the most important enforcement vehicle in the UCCC." 5
There are several reasons for this feeling. First, as has been noted, the
fact or the possibility of administratively initiated action is a valuable,
perhaps an essential, accessory to the UCCC's numerous criminal, self-
executing, and self-help remedies' 26 and even to the private rights
of action given to the consumer by the statute. 2 7  Secondly, in a num-
ber of instances administrative action is substantially the whole story.
This is true with respect to creditor failure to file notification and pay
fees,' 28 with respect to any enforcement of the notice provisions in
connection with advances to perform covenants of the debtor, 29 per-
haps with regard to the obligation of the creditor to provide the debtor
with a copy of any evidence of indebtedness signed by him when the
writing is signed,130 with regard to fraudulent or unconscionable con-
duct in inducing debtors to enter into or in the collection of debts arising
from consumer credit transactions,' 31 with respect to a licensee carrying
123. UCCC § 6.104(1)(b).
124. The Oklahoma Administrator has discovered several attempts, for example,
to lessen the impact of the notice of assignment provided for in OKLAHOMA UCCC §
2-404 by incorporating it, maybe even conspicuously, in advertising and "welcome as a
customer" type flyers. Cf., e.g., Peoples Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Landes, 28 Utah 2d 392,
503 P.2d 444 (1972). So far the problem has been rectified without having to conclude
any litigation. Telephone conversation with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel,
Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Jan. 12, 1973.
125. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 10; Curran, supra note 10, Jordan & Warren,
supra note 2, at 417-19. The administrative provisions of the UCCC are found ba-
sically in art. 6, pt. 1 and art. 3, pt. 5.
126. See text following notes 47, 71-72, supra, and notes 104, 123-24, supi'a.
127. See note 74, supra, and UCCC § 6.113, Comment 1.
128. See notes 43, 44, 45, and 46, supra.
129. UCCC H9 2.208(1), 3.208(1). A failure to provide the specified information
would not be a disclosure violation. UCCC H9 5.203(1), 2.302(1)(h), 3.302(1)(h);
cf. letter from Griffith L. Garwood, Chief of Truth in Lending Section of the Federal Re-
serve Board, June 24, 1971, 4 CCH CONSUMER CaRErr GuIDE 30,692 at 66,302 (the
purchase of VSI insurance where the customer fails to provide insurance under his con-
tract is a subsequent occurrence).
130. UCCC 99 2.302(2)(b), 3.302(2)(b). For a discussion of the problem in-
volved here, see Miller, Living with Both the UCCC and Regulation Z, supra note 25,
at 16 n.64.
131. UCCC § 6.111(1)(b), (c). UCCO: § 5.108 provides an individual con-
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on another business at a location where he makes supervised loans for
the purpose of evasion of the UCCC,1 2 and with respect to violations of
the advertising provisions of the UCCC.' 1m Thirdly, and perhaps of
most consequence, the Administrator under the authority granted to him
in the statute is in the best position to discover and cure violations of the
Code on a wide scale."3 4 This is so for two reasons. First, the Admin-
istrator has the power to receive complaints.'3 5 When an apparently
valid complaint is received, if it evidences a violation that has likely oc-
curred in more than one instance, 30 there may be probable cause for an
investigation by the Administrator to ascertain whether the particular
creditor has violated the statute on a broader scale.'3 7  If he has, ap-
propriate action can be taken to remedy the situation. 13 8 Secondly, the
sumer with rights only with respect to an unconscionable agreement or clause. But cf.
UCCC § 6.111(1)(a).
132. UCCC § 3.512. As to the type of problem encountered here, see Johnson,
The New Law of Finance Charges: Disclosure, Freedom of Entry, and Rate Ceilings,
33 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoB. 671, 678 (1968).
133. UCCC §§ 2.313, 3.312; see UCCC § 5.203(1). Compare letter from Mil.
ton W. Schober, Assistant Director of the Federal Reserve Board, April 22, 1970, 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 30,408 at 66,120 and Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
442 F.2d 78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971) (there is no private right
of action in connection with advertising violations). Of course, in addition to state ad-
ministrative enforcement, there is also federal administrative enforcement since any ex-
emption from the CCPA cannot extend to advertising; see UCCC § 2.313, Comment
1. But see Barrett, Truth in Lending-Advertising, 26 Bus. LAw. 829 (1971). Also,
the criminal provisions of the UCCC may be applicable. UCCC § 5.302.
134. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 10, at 910.
135. UCCC § 6.104(1)(a).
136. There are numerous examples possible here. To illustrate, the creditor may be
in the business of making home solicitation sales and his form may contain no buyer's
right to cancel (UCCC § 2.503); there may be absence of or an improper authorization
of a separate charge for consumer credit insurance (UCCC §§ 2.202(1)(b), (2)(b),
3.202(1)(b), (2)(b); there may be an invalid provision for the payment of attorney's
fees (UCCC §§ 2.413, 3.404, 3.514), and so on. Such situations are to be contrasted
with the case where the disclosure format is correct and one blank is merely not filled
in, which is probably an isolated instance.
137. UCCC § 6.106. Most investigations of non-lender creditors in Oklahoma are
a result of consumer complaints filed with the Administrator. 1972 ANNUAL RIPORT
5. The procedure involves the Administrator's serving notice on the creditor, which
notice advises the creditor of the authority to make the investigation, the sections of
the UCCC suspected to be violated, and demands immediate access to all records to
determine whether violations have occurred. To the extent necessary, the further pow-
ers granted the Administrator in UCCC §§ 6.106(1)-(3) may be used. To date, 139
administrative investigations have been instituted. 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, 6-7.
138. This could come in the form of a cease and desist order after notice and hear-
ing (UCCC § 6.108); the acceptance of an assurance of discontinuance (UCCC §
6.109); the filing of a civil action to recover excess charges and/or a civil penalty
§ 6.109); the filing of a civil action to restrain violations (UCCC § 6.110); or the filing
of a civil action to recover excess charges and/or a civil penalty (UCCC § 6.113).
In addition, although not a violation, if the complaint suggests unconscionable conduct
in more than the transaction involved in the complaint, as, for example, was the case
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UCCC directs the Administrator to examine at intervals he deems ap-
propriate the loans, business, and records of every licensee.13 Not only
will this process turn up any violations by the licensee, which can then
be corrected,140 but it is also very likely to turn up evidence of viola-
tions by those with whom the licensee deals, such as sellers of con-
sumer paper, which the investigative process can then substantiate and
which can likewise be rectified.14" '
Notwithstanding this, some writers have been less than optimistic
over the prospects of the described system. Their comments have pri-
marily been directed at the possibility of having an ineffective Admin-
istrator for reasons outside of the UCCC or an ineffective Administrator
due to deficient powers awarded by the statute itself.
On the first point, for example, one observation concludes: "Thus
the present draft will be effective only in those states having a well-
in one situation in Oklahoma where the complainant indicated to the Administrator that
others were involved in contracts similar to the one complained of as unconscionable,
after investigation, an injunction can be sought under UCCC § 6.110, 6.111 and
6.113 if necessary. Under this procedure, the vast majority of investigations which have
produced sufficient evidence to warrant administrative action have resulted in volun-
tary compliance, and in the few where that has not been true, a civil action has been
filed. Consequently, the provisions of UCCC § 6.108 have not to date proved valuable
in Oklahoma, and no cease and desist orders have been issued by the Oklahoma Ad-
ministrator. 1972 ANNuAL REPORT 6-7; Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General
Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City Dec. 19, 1972.
139. UCCC § 3.506(1). In addition, for the purpose of discovering violations or se-
curing information lawfully required, the Administrator may at any time investigate the
loans, business, and records of any regulated lender. In Oklahoma, since the dividing
line between supervised and non-supervised loans was reduced from eighteen percent
to ten percent, there are no regulated lenders as opposed to licensees. Compare
UCCC § 3.501 and OKLAHomA UCCC § 3-501. There are 559 licensees in Oklahoma,
but it should be noted that, unlike in the UCCC (§ 3.503), under OKLAHOMA UCCC §
3-504(7), a separate license is required for each office operated. 1972 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 3. Licensees receive regularly scheduled examinations at least once annually.
Special visits are scheduled in addition if excessive errors are noted. Id. at 5.
140. In Oklahoma, "each examination is prepared in writing, which includes docu-
mentation and analysis of loans, according to term, amount and charges, and an analysis
of the computations. The examinations also include an analysis of rebates, refunds
and insurance charges and the correctness of these computations." 1970 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 8. These written examinations are returned to the Department for review, where a
formal examination report is prepared, citing specific violations and the provisions of
the law involved. This report, together with a true copy of the actual examination, is
then forwarded to the licensee, and constitutes not only an instruction document but
also a demand for refunds or adjustments on the transactions which are necessary. Id.
at 5. Compliance, where not voluntary (and to date voluntary compliance has oc-
curred in all but one case), can be enforced by the authority specified in note 138,
supra, and, in addition, by a proceeding to revoke or suspend a license. UCCC § 3.504;
OLAHOMA UCCC § 3-505.
141. Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma Department
of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dew. 19, 1972; see n9t4 137-38 supra.
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financed, aggressive, consumer-oriented Administrator. It seems un-
likely that all Administrators in 50 states for the next 40 years will
meet these criteria."' 42 Obviously it is impossible at this point in time
to answer such an allegation from experience, but since the observation
was prompted by experience prior to the UCCC,143 perhaps it is fair to
make a counter-observation from the experience under the UCCC thus
far. In that regard, it can be generally stated without qualification that
the Oklahoma experience concerning administrative enforcement has
been satisfactory. "Well-financed," of course, is a relative term, and
while it is no doubt true that the Oklahoma Department of Consumer
Affairs could use more money, on the whole, it has not been financially
starved. 14 4  "Aggressive" is an ambiguous standard, but it might be
considered "aggressive" that the Oklahoma Administrator filed a civil
action under Oklahoma UCCC section 6.113 (1) for a refund of finance
charges that allegedly existed, even though not identified, in consumer
credit sale installment contracts discounted to a financing institution,'14
that the Oklahoma Administrator promulgated a rule getting at the so-
called "shrinking billing' 41 period while others were still talking,1
41
142. Spanogle, supra note 9, at 625.
143. Id. at 626-27.
144. The population of Oklahoma is 2,559,253. THE 1973 WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS 200. The Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs has a staff of
15, extending from the Administrator through secretaries, and has a budget for the
fiscal year 1972-1973 of $283,313. In 1972 ANNUAL REPORT 12. That this is suffi-
cient for adequate enforcement is attested by the Oklahoma exemption from the CCPA,
which exemption may be granted and continued only if there is adequate provision for
enforcement. See CCPA § 1633 and 1 CCH CONSUMER CREIT GUIDE (Okla.) 1
3671-73, 3679, 3681. Oklahoma provides for a separate license for each office and fees
in connection with the issuance and continuation of the license as well as for examina-
tions, which probably generates more revenue than the revenue structure of the UCCC.
Compare OKLAHOMA UCCC §§ 3-503(1), 3-504(7), 3-506(1) with UCCC §§ 3.503,
3.506. Compare the Oklahoma provisions above and OKLAHOMA UCCC §§ 6-201,
6-203 with UCCC §§ 6.201, 6.203. To conclude that the Oklahoma deviations from
the UCCC influence the economic position of the Oklahoma administrative agency is
undoubtedly correct, but to conclude that this will make Oklahoma unique as to
adequate funding is a far too simplistic view with respect to the total picture of
legislative appropriations.
145. For a discussion of the theory, see Miller, supra note 3, at 278-83. The ac-
tion was dismissed when the assignee-purchaser of the installment contracts agreed
to refund the amount of the discounts. Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General
Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972.
It might be protested this gave up a "test case," but when one considers the difficulty of
overcoming the presumption of UCCC § 2.110 and the possibility that part or none of
the discount was in law an excess charge (see UCCC § 2.201) as opposed to a disclo-
sure violation (see UCCC § 5.203(2)), this disposition seemed the most beneficial
and besides, as a practical matter, the point was established and became known.
146. See Rules of the Administrator, Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs,
part IV-General, § 400.2, 3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Okla) l 6711-12.
147. See, e.g., SENATE COMMrrEE ON BANKING, HOUSIo AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
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and that the Oklahoma Administrator has filed three, and successfully
concluded two, actions concerning unconscionability under UCCC sec-
tion 6.111.148 Not all "aggressive" actions have been immediately suc-
cessful, of course,149 but the point seems sufficiently made. Finally,
"consumer-oriented" is a clear enough criterion; it is simply an improper
one, however, since both creditors and consumers are entitled to an ad-
vocate at times, 150 and in the long run an impartial stance is the only
one that can result in practical effectiveness."' In short, if one con-
TRuH IN LENDNG Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S.652, dated April 17, 1972, CCH
Consumer Credit Guide Special Report No. 92, Part 1, at 8, April 25, 1972.
148. The two concluded cases involved consumer credit sales of dancing lessons to
limited income aged female consumers. In one case, the final contract consolidating
prior contracts was in the amount of 31,000 dollars for 1,050 hours of instruction sold
a widow of advanced age with an income from Social Security and limited other sources
of less than 500 dollars per month. The unconcluded case involves a consumer credit
sale of computer "dating" services.
149. For example, the Oklahoma Administrator promulgated a rule requiring dis-
closure in connection with consumer loands made to finance transactions that would
have been consumer credit sales but for the loans in an effort to resolve the so-called
direct loan problem under the UCCC. See Miller, An Alternative Response to the
Supposed Direct Loan Loophole in the UCCC, 24 OKLA. L. Rlv. 427 (1971). The rule
never became effective. The final chapter in this story, however, has not yet been writ-
ten. Compare, e.g., RUCCC §§ 3.403, 3.405, 3.501, 5.103, and Proposed Trade Reg-
ulation Rules on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, Fed. Trade Comm'nu
Revised Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GUmE 10,181-
86.
150. For example, one complaint filed with the Oklahoma Department of Consumer
Affairs involved a consumer who obtained a loan to purchase a $695 used car, and who,
after charges of $148.05 for credit life and disability insurance, $116 for auto physi-
cal damage insurance, $70.50 for other personal property insurance on his household
goods in which a security interest was taken, a finance charge, and official fees, came
out owing $1410. Given that the annual percentage rate indicated this transaction bore
the maximum finance charge permitted by law, it was thought the transaction fell
within the provisions of OKLAHOMA UCCC § 4-106. Under such oppressive but un-
tried circumstances, it is submitted the Administrator should take the consumer's side
pursuant to the powers granted him in UCCC art. 6, pt. 1. On the other hand,
another complaint brought to the Department showed a finance charge equaling an
annual percentage rate of about 240%, which disclosure no doubt prompted the com-
plaint. Such a charge, however, is legal in Oklahoma for small loans. See OKLAHoMA
UCCC § 3-508 B. In this situation, the Administrator should do more than tell the
consumer what was charged is legal; he should take the creditor's side, explain
to the consumer the necessity for the amount of the charge on such a small amount of
credit, but then perhaps, in addition, suggest that such a transaction represents an unwise
use of credit unless it is absolutely necessary.
151. The fact that the overwhelming majority of the over 3000 consumer com-
plaints filed with the Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, the 139 administra-
tive investigations so far instigated, and the examinations of licensees so far conducted
have all concluded by voluntary compliance (see notes 73, 138, 140, supra) is not an
accident. The reputation for tough impartiality which the Oklahoma Administrator has
gained assures a thoughtful response when action is taken. It is questionable, if the
Administrator instead were known as consumer oriented, whether such results could
be produced at all, let alone without a considerably greater expenditure in resources be-
cause of the need for litigation, since the administrative judgment would be viscerally sus-
pect.
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siders the experience to date in all UCCC jurisdictions,' it appears
that there is no discernible trend toward ineffective administrative en-
forcement of the statute because of captive or creditor-oriented Ad-
ministrators, grossly inadequate funding, or other reasons outside of the
UCCC itself.
As to the second point-an ineffective Administrator due to defi-
cient powers-some of the comments made are extremely theoretical.
For example, the criticism has been put forth that it is foolish to restrict
injunctions under UCCC section 6.111 only to those situations in which
the Administrator finds that a creditor has been engaging in a course of
illegal activity since a single violation should be met with an injunc-
tion.153 Theoretically, this is true, but since the resources of staff and
time are never infinite, the prerequisite hardly imposes a limitation that
does not already practically exist, and the point is thus negligible. The
same critics state the Administrator's counseling ability is too inade-
quate to protect creditors since there is no provision for declaratory
orders and thus that the Administrator's informal counsel, if adverse,
is nonappealable and, if favorable, cannot be relied upon to provide
protection from subsequent action by the Administrator. 5 4 That is
true enough so far as UCCC section 6.104 is concerned, although one
can question whether a UCCC Administrator would penalize past con-
duct taken pursuant to informal advice as opposed to future conduct
after notice of a change in opinion; but the objection is satisfied if one
notes that either UCCC section 6.409 or the administrative procedure
152. As is obvious from what has been said, in my opinion the Oklahoma experi-
ence has been good. This judgment is based upon the work of two summers as a formal
consultant to the Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, and upon numerous con-
tacts on an informal basis. See letter from J. L. Robertson of the Federal Reserve Board,
Sept. 22, 1972, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT Gum 30,885: "Oklahoma. . . , we be-
lieve, ...[is] doing a particularly good job of enforcement." What there is available
concerning the other UCCC states is also basically favorable. My personal impressions
of the people involved in enforcement there are to the good; the same Federal Reserve
Board letter cited above notes that Wyoming's staffing level appears to be adequate, and
the [1972] UTAH ADM'R AmNUAL REP., and STuciu, UTAH CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
REPORT VOL. II (1972), disclose an administrative experience in Utah not greatly
dissimilar to that of Oklahoma (for example, supervised lenders are examined at least
once each year, notification fees of twenty-five dollars per year generate sufficient reve-
nue to cover expenses, eight administrative hearings have been held with four resulting
so far in consent orders, eight suits have been brought with most satisfactorily con-
cluded so far; the largest difference is in the number of complaints-277-but initially
a complete record was not kept and the population of Utah is less than half that of Ok-
lahoma). But see Note, Utah's UCCC: Boon or Boondoggle, or Just Plain Doggle,
1972 UTAH L. REv. 133 (1972).
153. James and Fragomen, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Inadequate Reme-
dies Under Articles V and VI, 57 GEo. LJ. 923, 951 (1969).
154. Id. at 949 n.91.
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act of the state, as the case may be,155 will provide for declaratory
rulings.1
56
Another observer charges that the assurance of discontinuance,
under a literal reading of the statute, may not be used to handle claimed
violations of the UCC but only claimed violations of an Adminis-
trator's order or a court order515 and thus cannot be used to process
initial violations of the statute when an informal procedure would be
most useful to inform the creditor of the violation and impose a mild
sanction. 58 If one considers UCCC section 6.109 in isolation, this is a
possible result, but if one considers UCCC section 6.109 in conjunction
with UCCC section 6.106, which contains similar language and which
clearly indicates that any act or conduct aimed at need not have been
the subject of a formal proceeding, 9 the objection can be labeled as an
illusory problem.,
Some comments are good faith predictions that simply have not
been borne out. Thus it was prognosticated that, while there was a
theoretical possibility of putting a man out of business by taking away
his license, 1 0 it would not be an important part of the enforcement arm
as a practical matter' 61 In Oklahoma just the converse has happened.
The Oklahoma Administrator, pursuant to information received from
periodic examinations or other sources, has commenced eight administra-
tive revocation or suspension of license proceedings by serving notice
upon the creditors involved that they were believed to have engaged in
155. See UCCC § 6.401 and Comment; UCCC § 6.107.
156. Thus, in Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, H9 306-07 (1965) provide for
declaratory judgments and declaratory rulings, and to the extent required by those
statutes the Oklahoma Administrator has adopted a rule of implementation.
157. Under UCCC § 6.109, if it is claimed that a person has engaged in conduct
subject to an order by the Administrator (§6.108) or by a court (H§ 6.110-.112) the
Administrator may accept an assurance in writing that the person will not engage in the
conduct in the future.
158. Spanogle, supra note 9, at 643.
159. UCCC § 6.106, Comment 3. Moreover, the Oklahoma use of the assurance of
continuance has not followed the restrictive interpretation noted in the text; an assur-
ance has been taken in connection with the dismissal of a proceeding for the revocation
or suspension of a supervised lender's license. Interview with James A. McCaffrey,
General Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec.
19, 1972.
160. UCCC § 3.504(1) provides in pertinent part that the Administrator may
issue to a person licensed to make supervised loans an order to show cause why his
license should not be revoked or suspended for a period not in excess of 6 months. Af-
ter a hearing the Administrator shall revoke or suspend the license if he finds that the
licensee has repeatedly and willfully violated the UCCC or any rule or order lawfully
made pursuant to it or facts or conditions exist which would clearly have justified the
Administrator in refusing to grant a license in the first place.
161. Braucher, supra note 10, at 911.
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activity that might result in the suspension or revocation of their licenses.
The notices further stated the facts or conduct that warranted the action
and gave the licensee an opportunity to show compliance with the UCCC
and thereby avoid suspension or revocation. 1 2  One license has been
revoked, two proceedings were dismissed when the deficiencies were
voluntarily corrected and an assurance of discontinuance was fur-
nished,' 6 3 and five proceedings are still open. 64 The exceedingly high
rate of voluntary compliance with respect to consumer complaints and
examination reports must be due in part to this activity.'6 6 Another
observation that has gone awry with respect to the Oklahoma experience
is the proposition that temporary injunctive relief is available to the
Administrator only after notice and a hearing, no matter how clear the
violation, how convincing the evidence, how heinous the violation, or
how numerous the potential victims.'6 6 The Oklahoma Administrator
162. See Selected Rules and Regulations. Part rn-Procedure, Procedure Govern-
ing the Denial, Revocation or Suspension of License, Sec. 300.2. 3 CCH CONSUMER
CREDIT GuIuD (Okla.) I 6692-6694.
163. This was upon a determination that the errors resulted from negligence alone.
164. 1972 ANNuAL REPORT 7-8; Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Coun-
sel, Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972.
165. See notes 73 and 140, supra. Compare, for example, the criticism that the
Administrator literally cannot help the individual consumer who has been harassed
by all-night telephone calls (Spanogle), supra note 9, at 647, with the following Okla-
homa episode. A consumer complaint was filed with the Administrator against a super-
vised lender when a collection agent of the lender harassed the debtor by threatening
to have her thrown in jail and her welfare checks stopped for delinquent payments. A
telephone call to the lender from the Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs pro-
duced a written apology to the consumer from the lender with an assurance that such
conduct was not approved and would not happen again, a censure of the employee in-
volved, and an instructional memorandum to all employees concerning such conduct.
There no doubt is some validity connected with any observation that the favorable
Oklahoma experience is due not only to the license revocation and suspension record
described, but also in at least a small part to the different Oklahoma standard in this re-
spect. Under OKLAHOMA UCCC § 3-505, a license can be suspended or revoked with-
out limitation as to time upon a finding that the licensee either knowingly or without
the exercise of due care to prevent the same has violated any provision. That should
be sufficient to lay fear in even the most callous lender, and no doubt does to some de-
gree. However, this standard has remained solely "statutory overkill" in practice, and
the actual application has been sensible; the one license revoked in Oklahoma could
have been revoked under a standard like that of UCCC § 3-504(1) (a), and two pro-
ceedings were dismissed when only negligence was involved. Finally, the point might
be raised-then why not license other creditors? The current thinking on that is well
summed up in Braucher, supra note 10, at 911.
166. Spanogle, supra note 9, at 645. The comment was made with respect to
UCCC § 6.112, which provides, with respect to an action brought to enjoin viola-
tions, or unconscionable agreements or fraudulent or unconscionable agreements or
conduct, the Administrator may apply to the court for appropriate temporary relief
pending final determination. If the court finds, after a hearing held upon notice, that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent is engaging in or is likely
to engage in conduct sought to be restrained, it may grant any temporary relief or
restraining order it deems appropriate.
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was able to secure an ex parte temporary restraining order in the civil
action discussed earlier, and in each of the unconscionability actions he
has instituted.1
67
Some of the comments concerning anticipated difficulties in the ad-
ministrative enforcement of the UCCC, on the other hand, have been
substantiated in practice, but the problems engendered have fortunately
not been as debilitating as might have been expected, at least in Okla-
homa One danger widely recognized, although largely unsolvable,
168
was a loss of effectiveness due to any fragmentation of administration.' 9
In Olkahoma, administration of the UCCC is substantially centered in an
Administrator as head of a Department of Consumer Affairs,17 0 but the
Oklahoma Administrator has no powers of examination and investigation
over state-chartered supervised financial organizations nor, of course,
over federally chartered ones.' Accordingly, one of the most im-
portant benefits of the UCCC's administrative provisions in Oklahoma
could have been significantly reduced. 172  Pursuant to the direction for
cooperation contained in the statute, 73 however, state-chartered super-
vised financial institutions are examined by the Oklahoma Banking De-
partment in accordance with an examination prepared by the Oklahoma
Department of Consumer Affairs, with a copy of the examination find-
ings as they pertain to provisions of the UCCC placed on file with the
Department of Consumer Affairs. These examinations are reviewed;
deficiencies, if any, with applicable law are noted; and written instruc-
tion by the Department of Consumer Affairs is given to the creditor for
167. See note 148, supra. The argument for this result is that UCCC § 6.112
governs only the Administrator's ability to obtain ex parte relief under the UCCC; it
does not restrict his ability, if any there be, under other provisions of state law. Com-
pare Spanogle, supra note 9, at 645 nn. 88 & 89. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12
§§ 1382-85 (Supp. 1971).
168. See UCCC §§ 6.103 and Comment, 6.105; Jordan & Warren, supra note 2, at
419-26.
169. See note 168, supra; Braucher, supra note 10, at 911-12. Division along lines
of established expertise, for example leaving rule-making and some enforcement pow-
ers with respect to premium rates and insurance forms with the Commissioner of In-
surance, however, is not of the same nature. See Curran, supra note 10, at 738.
170. Oklahoma UCCC § 6-103, art. 6, pt. 5; Selected Rules and Regulations, Part
1-Organization, Purpose, Methods, Etc., 3 CCH CONsuMER CErr GUIDE (Okla.) f
6501. See also note 11, supra.
171. OKLAHOmA UCCC § 6-105; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6 §§ 201, 2008 (1966), as
amended (Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 381.11 (Supp. 1971); Jordan & War-
ren, supra note 2, at 420-21.
172. See note 134, supra. The percentage of consumer installment credit out-
standing held by such organizations in Oklahoma is over fifty percent, 1972 ANNUAL
REPORT 4.
173. OKLAHOMA UCCC § 6-105(3).
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remedial action.174 Consequently, little or nothing is lost due to a divi-
sion of authority in this respect. Unfortunately, the same cannot be
said with regard to federally chartered institutions. Despite continued
efforts on the part of the Oklahoma Administrator, procedures to have
federal regulatory agencies examine financial institutions for compliance
with state consumer protection laws have yet to be worked out.7 r
Another problem that has come to the fore is some loss of effective-
ness because of uncertainty as to the degree of creditor intent that must
be established by the Administrator before a civil penalty can be invoked
for various conduct.1 7  For example, to recover a civil penalty in con-
nection with excess charges the Administrator must establish that the
creditor has made an excess charge in deliberate violation of or in reck-
less disregard for the UCCC,177 and to recover a civil penalty for viola-
tions generally he must establish that the creditor has engaged in a
course of repeated and willful violations of the statute.'78 Consider
for a moment the following situation. An interstate lender, not a super-
vised financial organization, begins to make consumer auto loans in
Oklahoma at annual percentage rates varying between eleven percent
and fifteen percent per year. The lender does not procure a license
from the Oklahoma Administrator 79 pursuant to the advice of non-
Oklahoma counsel that no license is needed under the UCCC until the
annual percentage rate on consumer loans exceeds eighteen percent. 80
All such loans at an annual percentage rate in excess of ten percent are
void.' 8' Can the Oklahoma Administrator recover by civil action all
amounts paid on such loans, avoid the unpaid obligations,"8 2 and recover
civil penalties for making excess charges in deliberate violation of or in
reckless disregard for the statute and for repeated and willful viola-
174. 1972 ANN A ., REPORT 4-5.
175. Id. at 15-16. See also Report of the National Commission on Consumer Fi-
nance, Consumer Credit in the United States, CCH CONSUMER CREDIT Gumn, Issue No.
215, at 53-60 (1973).
176. See Spanogle, supra note 9, at 648-49.
177. UCCC § 6.113(1). In addition, a civil penalty may be had if a creditor bad
refused to refund an excess charge within a reasonable time after demand by the
debtor or the Administrator.
178. UCCC § 6.113 (2).
179. OxLAHOrmA UCCC H9 3-501, 3-502 stipulates that, unless a person is a super-
vised financial organization, he shall not engage in the business of making consumer
loans in which the rate of the finance charge exceeds the percent per year without hav-
ing first obtained a license from the Administrator authorizing him to make such
loans.
180. See UCCC H§ 3.501(3), 3.502. Compare the Oklahoma provisions described
in note 179, supra.
181. OKrAHOm.A UCCC § 5-202(2).
182. OXLA omA UCCC § 6-113 (1). UCCC § 6.113 (1) is the same.
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tions?'83 A situation similar to this hypothetical did arise in Okla-
homa,1 8 4 and while no action was brought under UCCC section 6.113-
(1) for refunds or a civil penalty,185 an action was brought by the Ad-
ministrator under UCCC section 6.113(2) for a five thousand dollar
civil penalty.'8 6 Ultimately, this action was dismissed when a satisfac-
tory settlement in the circumstances was made, but a considerable fac-
tor influencing that resolution was uncertainty whether the described
creditor conduct amounted to "willful violations."1
87
"Willful," in the above context, is not defined by the UCCC. More-
over, as previously noted,' it is highly questionable whether it should
be defined in this context without reference to its use, or the use of re-
lated standards, in other contexts. A logical place to begin constructing
a definition is with the civil liability provision for disclosure violations, 8 9
since that section is the only one among the several possibilities that has
any relevant judicial interpretation. 90 To establish liability under
UCCC section 5.203, it probably must be shown that the creditor conduct
constituting the disclosure violation was intentional; that is, was not un-
intentional and the result of a bona fide error notwithstanding the main-
tenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error.19' In other
183. OKLAHoMA UCCO §§ 6-113(1), (2). UCCC § 6.113(1) and (2) are the
same.
184. See note 74, supra.
185. First, there is perhaps a substantial question whether this is an excess charge
situation, and therefore forms the basis for a civil action under UCCC § 6.113(1). See
note 52, supra. Second, and more to the point, in the context involved, an action un-
der UCCC § 6.113(1) would preclude the debtor from having the option of carrying
through the contract if he desired and might come close to bankrupting the creditor,
practical considerations which merit some weight in view of the facts that the debtors in-
volved had adequate private rights of action OELAHoMA UCCC § 5-202(2)) and that
a successful action under UCCC § 6.113(2) would serve both as an example for deter-
rence and also to establish that violations had occurred. See notes 53, 54, 74, supra.
Finally, there is what might be called an ethical problem concerning a possible de-
fense of the creditor. Compare UCCC §§ 5-202(2), (7), and 6.113(1); perhaps there
is only an excess charge under UCCC § 6.113(1) after UCCC §§ 5.202(2), (7) are
considered together, and then perhaps one exists pursuant to UCCC § 5.202 (2) alone.
186. See note 74, supra.
187. See note 45, supra, and interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel,
Oklahoma Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972.
188. See notes 14, 23, 45, 53, supra.
189. UCCC § 5.203.
190. Actually, UCCC § 5.203 has not been judicially construed but CCPA § 1640
has. However, since the former is almost a carbon copy of the latter the learning should
largely be transferrable. See UCCC § 5.203, Comment.
191. UCCC §§ 5.203(1), (3). Technically, if the debtor shows a disclosure viola-
tion, liability may follow unless the creditor then shows by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the violation was unintentional and the result of a bona fide error under
proper procedures. Cf., e.g., Martin v. Glenn's Furniture Co., 126 Ga. App. 692, 191
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words, if the creditor intended to do that which constitutes the violation,
even if he did not intend to violate the law, liability is possible. 19-  This
standard would appear to apply also to other civil liability provisions con-
ferring private rights of action in the UCCC.198 If one considers that the
liability involved up to this point is more akin to compensatory damages
than it is to a civil penalty or a criminal sanction, 04 it seems logical that
a higher degree of creditor culpability should be required when an actual
civil penalty is at issue.' 5 This is apparently borne out when the pro-
vision providing for a civil penalty in an administratively initiated ac-
tion for excess charges is examined, 96 but probably still allows the con-
S.E.2d 567 (1972), and Jones v. Seldon's Furniture Warehouse, Inc., § - F. Supp.
-, 4 CCH CRPDrr GuDE 98,996 (E.D. Va. 1973).
192. E.g., Ratner v. Chem. Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
193. UCCC § 5.202(7). A basic exception exists with respect to the refund of ex-
cess charges, however, under UCCC § 5.202(3), where the fact of an excess charge
is sufficient without regard to the cause. Moreover, note that under UCCC § 5.203 (3)
the creditor may be held liable if it is established that the violation was intentional, but
it is arguable that the creditor may not be held liable under UCCC § 5.202(7), even if
that which constitutes the violation was intentional, unless it also was not the result of
a bona fide error, because of the use of the word "or" in that latter section. No dis-
cussion will be engaged in here as to whether a different standard was in fact intended
and thus whether "or" should be read as "and," or whether, if there is a different
standard, which is preferable, or indeed whether there is any practical difference be-
tween the standards. Those who do wish to pursue this point may want to contemplate,
for example, whether a violation is intentional when the creditor, notwithstanding
proper procedures and due to a bona fide clerical error, arrives at an incorrect dis-
closure figure on his woksheet and then transfers this incorrect figure correctly to the
disclosure statement. Suffice to say that generally the same definition of "intentional"
should prevail.
194. See, e.g., Ratner v. Chem. Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970). The court
in Bostwick stated that CCPA § 1640 (cf. UCCC § 5.203) is remedial rather than
punitive in nature even though the section provides that damages shall be two times the
finance charge, the double damage provision being only an incentive for aggrieved debt-
ors to initiate civil actions. 319 F. Supp. at 878. It would seem that generally the
same observation should hold for UCCC § 5.202 notwithstanding the use of the word
"penalty" therein. See generally Dole, supra note 10. Contra Eovaldi v. First Nat'
Bank, - F. Supp. -, 4 CCH CoNSuMER CREDrr Gum 1 99,054 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
195. Compare, e.g., Ratuer v. Chem. Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), with Martin v. Glenn's Furniture Co., 126 Ga. App. 692, 191 S.E.2d
567 (1972).
196. "If a creditor has made an excess charge in deliberate violation of or in reck-
less disregard for this Act . . . ." UCCC § 6.113(1). While the penalty accrues to
the debtor under this section, the incentive motive is removed since the Administrator
initiates the action, and thus the sanction appears to depart from any compensatory
related purpose and closely approaches a fine or quasi-criminal sanction. Oddly
enough, UCCC § 6.113(1) then goes on to provide that if the creditor establishes by a
preponderance of evidence that a violation is unintentional or the result of a bona fide
error, no liability to pay a penalty shall be imposed. If the violation was deliberate,
this clause can hardly apply since the violation would be intentional and not a result of
error. Even if the violation was the result of reckless disregard, it would not seem to
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clusion that "willfully," as used in UCCC section 6.113(2), can be
equated with "intentionally," because of the added condition for liability
in UCCC section 6.1113(2) that there must be a course of repeated
and willful violations. 9 ' This conclusion in turn suggests, however, that
"willfully" as used in the UCCC's criminal provisions'9 8 should require
more than intentional conduct,' 99 such as mala fides or an intention to
violate the law, if not more, as the case may be.200  Nonetheless, the
point remains that even if this definitional scheme tenuously hangs to-
gether, there are still enough questions in it to cause some potential loss
of effectiveness in administrative enforcement, 20I and perhaps in other
enforcement,20 2 under the UCCC.
Finally, experience has unearthed several problems that do not ap-
pear to have attracted observation in the writings concerning the admin-
istrative provisions of the UCCC to date. For example, the Administra-
tor is given the power, in connection with an investigation under UCCC
be the result of a bona fide error, and, as a practical matter, reckless disregard would
be almost impossible to separate from subjective intentional violation. Perhaps this
clause was intended only to relate to the other basis in UCCO § 6.113(1) for the impo-
sition of a civil penalty-if the creditor has refused to refund an excess charge within
a reasonable time after demand, and inappropriate draftsmanship makes it appear to
apply in both situations. See Spanogle, supra note 9, at 640 n.99. Another discordant
note in this analysis is that the same standard that is used in UCCC § 6.113(1) also
appears in UCCC § 5.202(4), relating to the debtor's ability to recover a penalty for ex-
cess charges and where presumably the incentive and thus compensatory related pur-
pose is involved. At this point one begins seriously to wonder whether a unitary, as
opposed to an ad hoc, analysis is possible.
197. Cf. Martin v. Glenn's Furniture Co., 126 Ca. App. 693, 191 S.E.2d 567
(1972); see notes 45 and 53, supra. Perhaps this is also the appropriate standard for li-
cense revocations or suspensions, since similar language is used and similar considera-
tions appear to exist. See UCCC § 3.504(1)(a).
198. UCCC §§ 5.301-.302.
199. Compare Ratner v. Chem. Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); see note 14, supra.
200. See notes 14 and 23, supra. But, to the contrary, one might argue that the
UCCC criminal provisions are similar to various food and drug laws, building regula-
tions and child labor laws where liability accrues basically from the violation alone
and thus "willful" should mean only intentional as opposed to inadvertent or acci-
dental. Other than the text, the best argument aginst this is that the similar provisions
of the CCPA have apparently not been so interpreted. See the full text of the materials
cited in note 34 supra.
201. See text accompanying note 187, supra. One can always simply argue that
by using the term "willful," the legislature must have meant something beyond "inten-
tional." See Martin v. Glenn's Furniture Co., 126 Ga. App. 692, 191 S.E.2d 567 (1972).
202. One wonders whether the affirmative response described in note 49, supra, con-
cerning criminal prosecution was motivated with the standard cited in note 14, supra,
in mind, which, according to the text discussion, may well be too low. But, of course, in
the context of that discussion, it would appear that even the higher standard could be
met. But then one wonders if the uncertainty as to the applicable standard, if appreci-
ated, and when coupled with the natural reluctance to bring a criminal prosecution
anyway, might not persuade most prosecutors that the matter is best avoided.
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section 6.106, to apply to a court for an order compelling compliance
upon a failure without lawful excuse to obey a subpoena or to give testi-
mony. Reasonable notice must be given to all persons to be affected by
the requested order.20 3  In Oklahoma a creditor once refused the Ad-
ministrator access to his records in an administrative investigation begun
when information, including several consumer complaints, evidenced a
course of repeated violations. From information that had been given to
the Administrator, this development had been foreseen. The Adminis-
trator had also anticipated that if the course of action stipulated in UCCC
section 6.106 (3) were then followed, there would be few, if any, original
records available when an order for compliance was secured. Fore-
warned, the Administrator filed a civil action under Oklahoma UCCC
sections 6.110, 6.111, and 6.113 on the basis of the information then at
hand, but with allegations that set out what the investigation was ex-
pected to disclose and also the probability that the records might dis-
appear. Pursuant to this action appropriate court orders were obtained
so that such refusal could be met with such orders without injurious
delay.20 4 It goes almost without saying that the Administrator should
not have to adopt a procedure such as this to effectuate his powers under
the UCCC.
For another example, the Oklahoma Administrator early recog-
nized that if a consumer filed a complaint of a disclosure violation and
the Administrator, pursuant to his authority to act on complaints, 21
contacted the creditor in an effort to resolve the matter, the consumer's
private right of action to recover for the violation 200 might be eliminated
under circumstances in which that right of action might be of substan-
tial value.207 This could occur because the UCCC provides that a
203. UCCC § 6.106(3).
204. Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma Department
of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972.
205. UCCC § 6.104(1)(a).
206. A creditor who, in violation of the provisions on disclosure other than adver-
tising, fails to disclose information to a person entitled to it under the UCCO is liable to
that person, except as otherwise provided in the section, in an amount equal to the
sum of (a) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction
but not less than one hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars, and (b) in
the case of a successful action to enforce the above liability, the costs of the action
plus reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court. UCCC § 5.203(1).
207. For example, if the creditor, in his disclosure statement in connection with an
extension of closed end loan credit on which the finance charge was $500, on a
broad basis failed to use anything approaching the terminology required by an Admin-
istrator's rule adopted pursuant to UCCC § 6.104(2) (in Oklahoma, see Selected Rules
and Regulations, Part 11-Disclosure and Advertising-Regulation Z, §§ 226.6(a), .8(b),
(d), 3 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GurmE (Okla.) 1 6571, 6602, 04) he might have a
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creditor has no civil liability for violation of disclosure provisions if,
prior to the institution of an action under UCCC section 5.203 or the
receipt of written notice of the error, the creditor discovers the error,
notifies the person concerned within fifteen days of discovery, and
makes whatever adjustments are necessary to assure that the person will
not be required to pay a finance charge in excess of the amount or per-
centage rate actually disclosed.20 8 Since the statute does not stipulate
that the creditor must discover the error without assistance and since
it is doubtful that notice from the Administrator would suffice to cut off
the curative right,2 9 a creditor could, upon receipt of the Administra-
tor's notice, deliver to the complaining consumer a corrected disclosure
statement and absolve himself basically from all liability. 10 This prob-
lem is solved easily enough in the case of the individual consumer by
advising him of his rights and then proceeding, or having the consumer
send a notice of the error211 prior to administrative action, or by closing
the complaint on advice to the consumer that he employ a private at-
torney, depending on the circumstances and the consumer's wishes in
the matter.212  But this solution is not feasible with respect to other
consumers who might be affected by the same disclosure violation as the
complaining consumer213 or in the case of violations discovered by the
liability of one thousand dollars. The defense of an unintentional violation resulting
from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adopted to avoid the error in UCCC § 5.203(3) would not appear to be applicable since
a violation of this scope evidences a reckless disregard for the legal requirements.
Cf. Richardson v. Time Premium Co., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 99,272-73
(S.D. Fla., Sept. 14, 1972).
208. UCCO § 5.203(2).
209. Compare UCCC § 6.113(1) where a demand by the debtor or the Administra-
tor is specified, and Dole, supra note 10, at 922 n.43.
210. If the disclosure error was such that an adjustment was required in connection
with the curative effort under UCCC § 5.203 (2) to assure that the consumer would not
be required to pay a finance charge in excess of the amount or percentage rate actually
disclosed, the creditor would not escape all consequences for his disclosure violation
and it could be argued therefore that the indicated result is a satisfactory one. It could
even be argued that in the hypothetical described in note 207, supra, the result is justi-
fiable since the purpose of UCCC § 5.203 is to assure proper disclosure, and if that
is accomplished, the justification for liability in that case no longer exists. But none of
this gets precisely at the Administrator's problem, which may be only a public relations
one but which is nonetheless real, of perhaps giving away a substantial cause of
action vested in the consumer.
211. Or errors. To be on the safe side, the notice should reasonably detail the
errors involved and not merely indicate there is a disclosure violation. The Adminis-
trator should have the authority to prepare this notice for the consumer under UCCC
§ 6.104(1)(a), (b).
212. Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma Department
of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972.
213. A disclosure violation of the type described in note 207, supra will undoubt-
edly exist in the creditor's other contracts if the form is printed, and probably even if it
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Administrator pursuant to an examination or an investigation. 214  In-
deed, no total solution, if one is possible, has been devised for these
situations; instead the Oklahoma Administrator has taken perhaps the
only position practically available, which is that in the vast majority of
cases the prompt resolution of violations through the administrative
enforcement process is more satisfactory to most consumers than pre-
serving a theoretically usable private right of action.215
In summation, experience relevant to the UCCC has so far dem-
onstrated that many of the problems perceived with respect to its ad-
ministrative provisions were largely illusory or were bad predictions.
Experience has also shown, however, that some of the problems envi-
sioned have in fact materialized, and that others exist that were not fore-
seen. Nonetheless, the verdict on the whole must be that the adminis-
trative provisions are both potentially and actually adequate for the
tasks assigned to them.21
is not However, the consumer participants in those other contracts are unknown for
purposes of contacting them, even if this were a feasible possibility. If the creditor
realizes this when the knowledge of the error arises out of the complaining consumer,
he can correct and absolve liability, unless the complaining consumer's notice can pre-
vent this, an unlikely conclusion. See Dole, supra note 10, at 922 n.43. Of course, of
some comfort is the fact that this would also be the result if the complaining con-
sumer acted on his own without the Administrator's assistance. Moreover, this sit-
uation is one for an administrative investigation to ascertain whether other contracts are
also subject to the violation, which then gets us to the next aspect of the problem.
214. If widespread disclosure errors are discovered in connection with an adminis-
trative investigation under UCCC § 6.106 or an examination under UCCC § 3.506,
theoretically the Administrator might contact the consumers affected prior to notice
of the errors to the creditor. But in reality, this idea has its obvious problems, and has
not been pursued by the Oklahoma Administrator under the rationale described in
the following text.
215. Most Oklahoma consumers to date have opted for compliance on the part of
the creditor obtained through the administrative process and have not chosen to pursue
a private right of action. Interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Okla-
homa Department of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972. It might be
noted here, however, that it is likely that the Oklahoma practice will have to be re-
examined if the present provisions of the RUCCC are finalized and that statute is en-
acted in Oklahoma, since the RUCCC considerably broadens the instances where a pri-
vate right of action is available to the consumer with a minimum recovery of $100
and a maximum recovery of $1000 and extends the curative defense or ability to
liquidate liability beyond the disclosure violation situation. Compare RUCCC § 5.201
and UCCC § 5.202. Indeed, since the discussed problem is probably inherently not
susceptible of full solution under this approach, the drafters of the RUCCC will hope-
fully consider this before finalizing RUCCC H8 5.201 and 5.203.
216. As noted before in a different context (see the concluding remarks in the
text concerning the UCC's self-executing provisions, supra), this hardly argues against
improvement. The RUCCC, in its present status, contains many such improvements.
Without being exhaustive, for example, the RUCCC clarifies the context in which an as-
surance of discontinuance can be used (see note 158, supra; RUCCC § 6.109), delin-
eates what may be included within the phrase "other appropriate relief" used in
UCCC § 6.110 and the Administrator's standing to sue in certain instances (see Span-
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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT PRoVIsIoNs OF THE UCCC
Finally, it is necessary to consider the private enforcement sec-
tions of the UCCC, which are expressly only two in number.2 17 They
are (1) a private action to enforce civil liability for violation of the dis-
closure provisions 218 and (2) a private action to enforce civil liability
for violation of (a) the provision applying to negotiate instruments, 19
(b) the provision applying to limitations on the schedule of payments
or term for regulated loans, 22° (c) the provision applying to authority
to make supervised loans,221 (d) the provisions regulating charges to
the debtor,222 and (e) the provision prohibiting discharge of the debtor
in connection with the garnishment of unpaid earnings.2 23
Comments concerning the probable effectiveness of the civil liabil-
ity section for violation of the UCCC's disclosure provision have been
mild in nature, perhaps because this section in all important respects
is the same as CPA section 1640, which confers a private right of ac-
tion for disclosure violations under the Truth-in-Lending Act.224  This
reticence has proved judicious, because there has been an avalanche of
activity attesting to the workability of these sections. Not surprisingly,
in light of its broader geographical scope, most of this experience has
been accumulated under the federal statute,225 but the lessons are largely
ogle, supra note 9, at 646-47; RUCCC § 6.110), and expressly settles the scope of
the Administrator's authority concerning "excess charges" under UCCC § 6.113(1)
(see note 185, supra; RUCCC § 6.113). Of course, the RUCCC does not resolve all
the present problems (for example, RUCCC § 6.112 is the same as UCCC § 6.112-
see text after note 165, supra), and may even exacerbate some (see note 215, supra),
but more is done than underdone.
217. Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew
Private Enforcement?, supra note 10, at 1044. However, see Spanogle, supra note 9,
the previous discussion in this article under the text headings concerning the self-
executing and self-help provisions of the UCCC, and UCCC § 5.202, Comment 2.
218. UCCC § 5.203.
219. UCCC § 5.202(1).
220. Id.
221. UCCC § 5.202(2).
222. UCCC § 5.202(3), (4).
223. UCCC § 5.202(6).
224. See, e.g., Spanogle, supra note 9, at 653; Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed
Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, supra note 10, at 1046.
225. No particular purpose would be served and too much space would be in-
volved to specify the details of each published private action under CCPA § 1640 for dis-
closure violations to date. See, e.g., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GurDE 71,201, 71,204-
05, 71-323-24. The textual statements can be substantiated by noting that in its 1971
report to Congress, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System stated that
the Board was aware of 71 civil actions brought under CCPA § 1640 for damages for
alleged violations and it was likely that additional suits had been instituted. FED.
RESERVE BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO CoNGRESs ON TRUTH iN LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1971,
at 9 (1972). The Board's report for 1972 contains no such statistic. See also, Hale,
The Direction of Litigation in the Consumer Credit Field, 28 Bus. LAw. 639 (1973).
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applicable to UCCC section 5.203 because of the substantial similarity
of the statutes.2 ' One can argue with a fair degree of credibility that
much of this flood has been prompted by the class action, 2 7 and now
that the bloom is perhaps temporarily off the class-action rose,228 more
must be learned before any final conclusions can be drawn. This is
no doubt a safe observation, but the residual experience omitting te
class actions, 229 the theoretical possibilities still open,28 0 and the prob-
226. In an effort to obtain an idea as to how many private actions had been in.
stituted in Oklahoma for violations of the UCCC (Oklahoma has received an ex-
emption from the CCPA-Regulation Z § 226.12, Supp. I, Par. (c), 1 CCH CoN.
SMER CREDrr GuIDE (Okla) 3681-so most actions, except as to a few classes of
credit transactions not exempted, would concern the Oklahoma UCCC), I published a
request for information in the Oklahoma Bar Association Journal, a weekly publication
of the Oklahoma Bar which reaches all practicing attorneys in the state. Based on the
reply, and on an interview with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma De-
partment of Consumer Affairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972, at least six disclo.
sure violation private actions have been brought to date in Oklahoma. Since the reply
was somewhat limited I have no way of knowing what percentage this is of the actual
total. One could surmise it might be a fairly high percentage, since compliance has
generally been good in Oklahoma and a large number of disclosure violation situations
have been handled through the Oklahoma Administrator: 60 in the period ending
Dec. 31, 1970, 160 in the period ending Dec. 31, 1971, and 125 in the period ending
Dec. 31, 1972. See 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 15-16; 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 7; 1972 AN.
NUAL REPORT 9. Even if one makes the assuredly erroneous assumption that six cases
are the extent of it, this is still in the neighborhood of five percent of the probable pres-
ent federal experience, and Oklahoma has only about one percent of the United States
population.
227. In 49 of the 71 known cases in 1971 under CCPA § 1640, class action status
was sought. FED. RESERvE BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LEND-
iNo FOR THE YEAR 1971, at 9 (1972). Of the six Oklahoma cases, only one involved
class action, however.
228. "mhe clear trend appears to be against the allowance of class actions in
Truth in Lending suits." FED. RESERVE BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
TRUTH IN IENDING FOR THE YEAR 1972, at 7 (1973). I know of no ruling yet in Okla.
homa.
229. In Oklahoma, as noted, five of the six private actions for disclosure violations
were not class actions. Under CCPA § 1640, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GumE-
Current Topical Index to New Developments: Truth-in-Lending, at 71,203 et seq. dis-
closes that as of this writing six out of the sixteen cases reported there were not brought
as class actions, or something over thirty-five percent.
230. In a civil action for a disclosure violation under UCCC § 5.203, if a violation
is shown and neither of two defenses, one of which can be cut off by either notice
or the action itself, is established, a recovery of twice the finance charge, with a
minimum of one hundred dollars and a maximum of one thousand dollars, is pos.
sible, plus costs of the action and reasonable attorney's fees. Even without theory, this
can produce some noteworthy results. See, e.g., Grubb v. Oliver Enterprises, Inc., 4
CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GumE 99,094 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 1972), where the debtor
recovered a total of two hundred dollars for disclosure violations on two loan contracts
bearing total finance charges of 11.18 dollars and amounting to 111.88 dollars of total
debt, and 1750 dollars for attorney's fees were awarded. But with theory, even this dra-
matic a story is too simplistic a picture. In Wachtel v. West, 344 F. Supp. 680 (E.D.
Tenn. 1972) aff'd, - F.2d -, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GrmIE 99,036 (6th Cir.
1973) the consumers, trying to get around the statute of limitations (CCPA § 1640
(e), UCCC § 5.203(5)), argued that the failure to disclose was a continuing violation.
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able shape of future developments 231 indicate that suitable private en-
forcement of the UCCC's disclosure requirements is likely to continue.
If this argument were extended to liability, it might produce a recovery of at least one
hundred dollars per day from the time of the credit extension until some later date,
such as notice of the violation or suit. The argument in Wachtel was turned back, and
so should it be if it were used in relation to liability, but the lesson for innovative ad-
vocacy is obvious. A more tenable proposition, which one can conclude so far has
largely been postponed in assertion by the class action lure, is what might be called the
cumulation of liability argument. To illustrate, UCCO § 5.203(1), in pertinent part,
provides that a creditor who, in violation of the provisions on disclosure, fails to dis-
close information to a person entitled to the information, is liable. Suppose in a
consumer loan carrying a 120 dollar finance charge the creditor fails to make any dis-
closure at all. Is his liability 240 dollars (twice the finance charge), or 2640 dollars
($240 x 11, the number of items of information required to be disclosed in the trans-
action under UCCC § 3.306(2)-note the 1000 dollar limitation of UCCC § 5.203
would not be exceeded for any one violation in this view); in short, does the liability
under UCC § 5.203 relate to items of information or to the "transaction"? For a more
detailed discussion, see Dole, supra note 106 and for a ramification of it in open end
credit, see Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., - F. Supp. -, 4 CCH CONSUMER
CREDrr GUIDE 99,056 (N.D. Ga. 1972), affd, as to this issue, - F.2d -, 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREnrr GumE 99,004 (5th Cir. 1973). This cumulation argument has been
presented in one of the Oklahoma disclosure violation actions, but no direct ruling ap-
parently occurred, since the action involved an unlicensed lender and the relief was
limited to avoidance of the transaction, perhaps on a Bostwick analysis. See note
105, supra.
231. First, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board) has
recommended that CCPA § 1640 be amended so as to recognize the class action as an
enforcement tool but also to set limits so the use of that device will not result in a
horrendous, possibly annihilating, punishment. FED. REsERvE BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1972, at 13-14, 31 (1973). If this
probable (a similar proposal passed the United States Senate) amendment occurs, it is
likely that UCCC § 5.203 will be similarly amended, which will rejuvenate (see note
228, supra) the class action device in this context. If that transpires, there will
be less need for theoretical arguments such as the cumulation of liability proposition
(see note 230, supra), on which the board made a negative recommendation (see
FED. REsERvn BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR TIE
YEAR 1972, at 15, 32 (1973), and so what otherwise could be an adverse possible fu-
ture development is mitigated. Second, it appears that the probable final interpretation
of the defense to disclosure violation liability which concerns an unintentional viola-
tion resulting from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid the error will be to exclude errors of law. See Owens v.
Modern Loan Co., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GUIDE [ 99,099 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 1972);
Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D.C. Alas. 1971), rev'd, 469 F.2d
453 (9th Cir. 1972); Buford v. American Finance Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga.
1971); Ratner v. Chem. Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
For a discussion of the issue, see Dole, supra note 10. For the most part, this seems a
desirable development, and one that is possible under UCCC § 5.203(3). For instance,
in Oklahoma the issue has arisen whether a creditor can rely on an opinion of counsel,
even though that opinion is completely erroneous. The Board also has made a recom-
mendation toward allowing a "good faith reliance" defense in connection with CCPA §
1640 (see FED. REsERvE Bn., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRuTr IN LENDING FOR
THE YEAR 1972, at 14-15, 32 (1973), but any adoption of that suggestion for the CCPA
should not influence the interpretation of UCCC § 5.203(3) since that recommendation
is limited to a rule, regulation or interpretation of the Board, and the UCCC already has
a substantially similar rule. UCCC § 6.104(4). It might be noted that this latter
point concerning errors of law as a defense perhaps becomes more complex when the
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There has been no such bountiful experience relevant to the UCC's
other right of private action since the CCPA does not go much beyond
requiring disclosure. The published comments about this enforcement
provision have been generally critical.28 2 For example, one observer
has stated that the consumer has a right of action only if the violation
concerns "excess charges" or what once was called usury.288 Without
undertaking an explanation of the law of usury,234 one can say that this
description of the matter may give a misleading impression of the scope
of UCCC subsections 5.202(3) and (4), which provide in substance
that if a debtor has paid an amount in excess of the lawful obligation
under the agreement, he may recover the excess amount and, in appro-
priate circumstances, a penalty in an amount determined by a court
within stipulated limitations. If the debtor is charged more than the
maximum rate of finance charge that the UCCC permits, 2 5 a recovery
is certainly authorized. 236  But there is little doubt that the debtor is
also empowered to recover, for example, unauthorized additional
charges, 237 delinquency charges excessive in amount or imposed less
mistake of law is not in relation to what the disclosure rules require (as was apparently
involved in the cited four cases), but rather is in relation to a substantive rule of state
law which then generates a disclosure violation. For a case which seems to involve this
last situation but where the issue has not yet been reached, see Kenney v. Landis Fi-
nancial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972), 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GumE 1[ 99,100 (N.D. Iowa June 19, 1972) (motion to amend). If there is a disclo-
sure violation in such cases the considerations behind the denial of a defense for er-
rors of law would seem to apply equally whether the mistake is as to the requirements
of the disclosure rules or as to the requirements of substantive state law upon which
any disclosure obligation is based. But query, should a contractual provision for, e.g., a
prepayment penalty and appropriate disclosure thereof under UCCC § 6.104(2) and, as
an Administrator's rule, Regulation Z § 226.8(b)(6), when under state law, e.g., UCCC
§§ 2.209, 3.209, such a penalty is prohibited, constitute a disclosure violation since in
truth no disclosure is required, but perhaps it is misleading additional information-
Regulation Z § 226.6(c).
232. E.g., "Effective private enforcement depends upon the solution of two prob-
lems: The consumer must be induced to seek legal counsel; and the attorney must
be paid, whether he litigates or not. The UCCC attacks neither of these problems, how-
ever, which indicates to this author that the problems have not been sufficiently ana-
lyzed." Spanogle, supra note 9, at 666. Contra, Thrift Funds of Baton Rouge, Inc. v.
Jones 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 99,076 (La. Sup. Ct. 1973).
233. Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew
Private Enforcement?, supra note 10, at 1044.
234. See, e.g., Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAW.
333 (1967).
235. For closed-end sales, see UCCC § 2.201. For open end sales, see UCCC §
2.207. For non-supervised loans, see UCCC § 3.201. For supervised loans, see UCCC
§ 3.508. See also UCCC §§ 2.205, 2.206, 3.205, 3.206.
236. See UCCC § 6.113, Comment 1.
237. See UCCC §§ 2.202, 3.202. In some instances, an unauthorized additional
charge may be treated as part of the finance charge rather than immediately as an ex-
cess charge, however. For a full discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 283-88.
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than ten days after a scheduled installment is due,238 penalty charges
collected on prepayment in full, 23 9 unearned charges in connection with
finance-charge rebates, 240 excessive finance charges as a result of the use
of multiple agreements,2 41 an excessive charge at the expiration of a con-
sumer lease,242 additional charges in connection with an unauthorized
change of terms with respect to open-end credit,243 an excessive charge
for insurance,244 penalties or excessive charges in connection with the
refinancing of balloon payments,2 45 and payments made in connection
with referral sales, 246 a home solicitation sale that has been cancelled,
24 7
or a transaction with respect to which a security interest was retained or
acquired in the debtor's residence that has been rescinded.24 While
there may be more doubt as to whether a void loan comes under the
provisions of UCCC subsections 5.202(3) and (4),219 the point seems
sufficiently made that these subsections are not unduly restrictive in
nature.
The same observer has also commented in substance that the only
238. UCCC §§ 2.203, 3.203.
239. UCCC §§ 2.209, 3.209.
240. UCOC §8 2.210, 3.210.
241. UCCC 88 2.402, 3.409, 3.509.
242. UCCC § 2.406.
243. UCCC §§ 2.416, 3.408.
244. UCCC § 4.104.
245. UCCC §§ 2.405, 3.402, and note 111, supra.
246. UCCC § 2.411 and comment 3. See also note 111, supra.
247. UCCC § 2.504.
248. UCCC § 5.204. It might be argued that in connection with these last two
provisions, the debtor's only remedies are those provided in the sections. such as reten-
tion of any property delivered by the creditor until he performs his obligations. See
UCCC § 2.504 and Comments, § 5.204(2), and note 113, supra. However, consid-
erations arguing against this conclusion are: (1) the possible inadequacy of these rem-
edies (what if the creditor has delivered no property, for example?); (2) various com-
ments to the UCCC (UCCC § 2.504, Comment 5, indicates retention of property is a
means of assuring compliance by the seller; UCCC § 5.202, Comment 2, states that the
statute provides for other remedies in addition to those set forth in UCCC § 5.202,
citing both UCCC 8H 2.501 and 5.204); and (3) the general direction commanding
liberal construction (UCCC § 1.102(1)). In addition, it might be noted that some of
the sections cited (e.g., UCCC § 4.104) specifically refer to UCCC § 5.202, and some
(e.g., UCCC 88 2.202, 3.202) do not. This should not be deemed relevant in
light of the general direction commanding liberal construction noted above, and, indeed,
if it were, it could result in the inequitable general proposition, for example, that unau-
thorized additional charges not paid cannot be collected, but that those paid can-
not be recovered. Cf. UCCC § 5.205.
249. Cf. note 52, supra. Indeed, since in this context UCCC § 5.202(2) speci-
fically authorizes a right of action, and some differences can be generated by interplay-
ing UCCC § 5.202(2), (3), (4), (7), it would appear the preferable construction is
that UCCC § 5.202(2) alone controls. This sort of problem is avoided in the
RUCCC. See RUCCC §§ 5.201(2), 6.113(1), (2). The RUCCC also adopts a bet-
ter recovery scheme in relation to excess charges. See RUCCC § 5.201(3), (4).
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violation for which both principal and interest may be cancelled is
the making of supervised loans without a license, 2 0 but that this penalty
seems illusory since the distinction between supervised loans and others
is the greater finance charge rate allowed the supervised lender, and
therefore that the creditor who charges more than the rate allowed for
non-supervised loans may claim that he is merely a usurer, not an
unlicensed supervised lender, and that he is liable for no more than the
lesser usury penalties under UCCC subsections 5.202(3) and (4).
251
Of course, anyone can claim anything, but since this argument would
render UCCC subsection 5.202(2) without any function whatsoever,
it is unlikely to prevail.252  A more relevant question concerning UCCC
subsection 5.202(2) liability exists with respect to the defense available
to a creditor who can establish by a preponderance of evidence that a
violation is unintentional or the result of a bona fide error.25 8 Consider,
as occurred in Oklahoma,25 4 the case of an unlicensed lender who is
not a supervised financial organization and who makes consumer car
loans at an annual percentage rate of twelve percent. The lender bases
his conduct on the advice of counsel that no license is necessary until
the annual percentage rate exceeds eighteen percent under the UCCC,
but the jurisdiction involved has changed the eighteen percent figure to
ten percent. This would be an intentional violation within the rationale
of the Ratner case, 255 but it would be the result of a bona fide error? If
errors of law are not errors within the purview of the defense, then
the answer is "no." It is strongly submitted that this should be the
result, for otherwise any opinion of counsel, no matter how inconsider-
ate, would bar consumer recovery for what, considering the sanction,
was contemplated as the worst civil violation of the UCCC that could
occur. 
2 5 6
250. UCCC § 5.202(2).
251. See Spanogle, supra note 9, at 653.
252. In Oklahaoma, one is reminded of the argument under the old usury law that
a creditor could relieve himself of the penalties imposed by that statute by writing into
the contract an agreement to rebate or refund interest collected in excess of the le-
gally authorized rate, which prevailed until the court realized it had been had. See
Oklahoma Pre-Fin. & Loan Corp. v. Morrow, 497 P.2d 221 (Okla. 1972).
253. UCCC § 5.202(7).
254. See note 74 supra.
255. Ratner v. Chem. Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). Of course, Ratner involved a disclosure violation under CCPA § 1640, but
the terms of the defense there are substantially equal to that of the defense here.
256. Cf. a similar issue discussed in note 231, supra. The RUCCC disagrees,
providing in RUCCC § 5.201(8) that if a creditor establishes by a preponderance of
evidence that a violation is unintentional or the result of a bona fide error of law or fact
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
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As a final example, another critic has noted that UCCC subsection
5.202(1) provides a remedy of no more than three times the finance
charge in the event a creditor takes a negotiable, as distinguished from the
required non-negotiable, 257 note,258 and that on a three hundred dollar
installment credit sale in which the maximum finance charge would be
sixty dollars for a one-year agreement, the most a debtor could recover
for a violation would be 180 dollars.259  The implication is that a con-
sumer would be reluctant to fight a lawsuit for that amount.2(0  That is
only one side of the picture, however. The other side is perhaps repre-
sented by a current lawsuit in Oklahoma under Oklahoma UCCC sub-
section 5.202(1) against a home builder who allegedly made consumer
credit sales and took negotiable promissory notes.261  While that particu-
lar suit is a class action, the potential liability in any individual case26
( 2
would be more than enough to warrant suit.263  But the main point in
violation or error (for procedures in relation to errors of law, see Dole, supra note 10)
no liability is imposed under subsection (1) and (2) (the void loan subsection), and
(4). Obviously, I dissent as to subsection (2), and also at least as to subsection (1), as
the discussion, infra, will disclose.
257. UCCC § 2.403.
258. The same remedy applies if the creditor violates the limitations on the
schedule of payments or loan term for regulated loans. UCCC § 5.202(1), 3.511.
259. Fritz, supra note 10, at 516.
260. Actually, the consumer could derive greater benefit than this as § 5.202(1)
provides if a creditor has violated UCCC § 2.403, the debtor is not obligated to pay the
finance charge and has a right to recover a penalty in an amount determined by the
court not in excess of three times the amount of the finance charge. Attorney's fees
also may be awarded. UCCC § 5.202(8). Is this enough? Consider the class action
device, and Sanco Enterprises, Inc. v. Christian, discussed in note 75, supra.
261. Note that, except for disclosure and debtor's remedies in connection there-
with, a consumer credit sale does not include the sale of an interest in land if the fi-
nance charge does not exceed ten percent "simple" per year. UCCC § 2.104(2) (b).
Note also that the defense of an unintentional violation or a violation the result of a
bona fide error applies with respect to liability under UCCC § 5.202(1). UCCC §
5.202(7). The previous observation with regard to the exclusion of errors of law (see
note 256, supra) should apply here, since a basic purpose behind the elaborate rules as
to the form of a negotiable instrument is to be able to clearly identify it as such. See
J. Whrnm & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK oF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIoR COMMEl-
CrAL CODE 399 (1972). Thus, the defense should be reserved for those situations
where, for example, the salesman by mistake picks out a negotiable note blank rather
than a non-negotiable note blank, if such a situation can be called a "bona fide" error.
262. By way of illustration, the interest on a monthly payment thirty-year seven
percent loan will be something like one and two-fifths times the principal amount. Ben-
field, The Effect of Credit Regulation on Real Estate Transactions, 25 Bus. LAw. 501,
503 (1970). While the contracts here may be shorter, the finance charge will
be higher. See note 261, supra. Multiply that times three (note there is no maxi-
mum liability in UCCC § 5.202(1)).
263. The description of the Oklahoma experience in this part of the article are
derived from replies to the request for information (see note 226, supra) and Interview
with James A. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Consumer Af-
fairs, in Oklahoma City, Dec. 19, 1972. In addition to the above action, a second class
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all of this is that the remedy provided in UCCC subsection 5.202(1) is
simply inappropriate. In that respect, the RUCCC will be a substantial
improvement.264
One could expect from the published enunciations concerning the
private enforcement provisions of the UCCC other than for disclosure
violations that the actual experience with them should be pretty dismal.
Such has not been the case in Oklahoma. In addition to the two law-
suits previously noted265 for violations of the prohibition against negoti-
able instruments, two actions have been brought under Oklahoma UCCC
subsection 5.202(2) in connection with supervised loans made without
a license, and two others have been brought under Oklahoma UCCC
subsections 5.202(3) and (4) for excessive charges.260 Overall, then,
one can fairly conclude that the private enforcement provisions of the
UCCC are working2 67 and, with the prospective advent of the
RUCCC,268 are likely to work even better in the future.
action under OKLAHom& UCCC § 5.202(1) has been brought against an automobile
dealer for allegedly taking negotiable promissory notes in consumer credit sales. Of
course, the potential liability here even on an individual basis is not small either. A
demurrer to the petition was sustained on the ground the notes were not negotiable,
and the case is on appeal.
264. In addition to broadening the types of violations for which a private action
is expressly provided, RUCCC § 5.201(1) provides that the consumer has a cause of
action to recover actual damages and in addition a right in an action other than a
class action to recover a penalty in an amount determined by the court not less than
$100 nor more than $1000. Costs and attorney's fees are also recoverable. RUCCC §
5.201(9). This, of course, adopts the scheme which has basically proven itself in con-
nection with disclosure violations.
265. See note 263 and accompanying text, supra.
266. None of these is or was a class action. In addition, it is probable that there
are others, since as previously noted, the response to my inquiry for information was
somewhat limited. Finally, and perhaps only by way of information considering the
context here, there is a class action pending concerning home solicitation referral sales,
although if the analysis of the scope of the excess charge remedy (see notes 246,
247, and 248, supra) in this article is sound, perhaps that lawsuit is properly listed
here too.
267. Of the two types of private actions not discussed with reference to experience,
one is the right to recover lost wages as a result of a violation of UCCC § 5.106 pro-
hibiting discharge of an employee in connection with the garnishment of his unpaid
earnings for the purpose of paying a judgment arising from a consumer credit transac-
tion. UCCC § 5.202(6). There has been no experience here in Oklahoma, probably
because Oklahoma significantly reduced the scope of UCCC § 5.106. See OKLAHOMA
UCCC § 5-106. However, at least the UCCC provides a private right of action here;
there is none with respect to a similar provision in CCPA § 1674. Simpson v. Sperry
Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La. 1972). The other action is for violation of
UCCC § 3.511 regulating the schedule of payments in certain consumer loans.
UCCC § 5.202(1). Lack of experience here is probably largely attributable to effec-
tive administrative examination, although the private remedy would clearly be less pro-
ductive in these cases due to the amounts of the finance charge involved. Again see
note 264, supra.
268. See notes 249 and 264, supra.
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CONCLUSION
Forecasting is a risky process. The subject matter of this article
perhaps illustrates that as well as anything, although the daily weather
reports may illustrate it more frequently. Nonetheless, this observa-
tion has never stopped the prognostication business, and that holds true
here. To the extent that the published forebodings discussed above,
as well as others not discussed, have resulted in potential improvements
in the enforcement provisions of the UCCC via the RUCCC, these nega-
tive forecasts have been all to the good. To the extent, however, that
they may have influenced the postponement of the enactment of the
UCCC in any jurisdiction, this is unfortunate. The main purpose of
this article then has been to temper any such impact by presenting the
overwhelmingly favorable experience relevant to the UCCC to date.
Admittedly, the UCCC, as to enforcement, is not a perfect statute. In
fact, it is doubtful whether the RUCCC, when it is finalized, will be
perfect either, especially if one considers the complexities with which
it deals and the compromises involved in its preparation, although per-
haps the actual experience under the UCCC can assist in its movement
toward that goal. In the final analysis, the crucial point should be that
the UCCC has demonstrated that it works. Thus, with what is now
available or soon will be available in the RUCCC, the time has come
to get the UCCC out of the law reviews and onto the statute books.
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